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INTRODUCTION
The workshop organised by the Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) on 24 April 
2015, is part of a joint research project of the 
European Parliament and European University 
Institute (EUI), on the History of Budgetary 
Powers: Institutional conflicts and achievements. 
This workshop follows the approach of the RSCAS, 
offering a platform for policy reflections between 
academics and practitioners. Its aim is not to give 
policy advice, but to stimulate an open discussion 
on the problems of the EU’s own resources 
problems, which have not only an economic but 
also an important institutional dimension.
On this occasion the experts all had an in-depth 
knowledge of the problems of the EU budget and 
its financing from different angles.
The topic of EU own resources is high on the 
European agenda after the European Council 
agreed with the European Parliament’s proposal 
to set up a High Level Group on own resources 
(HLGOR) with the aim to assess the situation 
and eventually to present proposals by the end of 
2016. The HLGOR is chaired by Mario Monti and 
composed of independent Members appointed by 
the three Institutions1.
1 The decision taken in the context of the negotiations over 
the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014 
– 2020. The Group is composed of representatives of the 
Institutions: Ivailo Kalfin (former MEP, Deputy Prime-
Minister of Bulgaria and Minister of Labour and Social 
Policy), Alain Lamassoure (French MEP in the EPP 
group) and Guy Verhofstadt (Belgian MEP, chair of the 
ALDE group, former Prime Minister), appointed by the 
EP; Daniel Dăianu (former MEP and Finance Minister 
of Romania), Clemens Fuest (President of the Centre for 
European Economic Research ZEW in Germany) and 
Ingrida Šimonytė (former Minister of Finance of Lithu-
ania), appointed by the Council; and · Kristalina Geor-
gieva (Vice-President of the Commission in charge of 
budget and human resources), Pierre Moscovici (Com-
missioner for economic and financial affairs, taxation 
and customs) and Frans Timmermans (First Vice-Pres-
ident of the Commission responsible for better regula-
tion, inter-institutional relations, rule of law and Charter 
of Fundamental Rights).
This workshop was organised after the presentation 
of the first assessment report of the HLGOR and 
before the discussion with National Parliaments 
and the presentation of proposals of the High 
Level Group. The EUI had the privilege of the 
participation of, amongst others, two of the main 
components of the High Level Group, its chair, 
Mario Monti and MEP, Alain Lamassoure.
The workshop benefitted also from the 
contributions of discussants, including Michael 
Bauer, Giacomo Benedetto, Jorge Nunez, Carlos 
Closa, Gregory Claeys as well as the contribution 
of some European Parliament Members, Former 
Members of the European Parliament and of the 
Court of Auditors: as Alain Lamassoure, James 
Elles, Monica Frassoni and Milan Cvikl. Their 
contributions have enriched the debates and are 
reflected in the various chapters.
This publication, gathers the contributions of the 
various participants and we hope that it reflects 
the vivacity of the debates held at the EUI and can 
possibly constitute a reference for those  who wish 
to further their knowledge on this matter.
Brigid Laffan,  
Director RSCAS 
Alfredo De Feo,  
European Parliament fellow at the RSCAS
EU OWN RESOURCES: MOMENTUM FOR A REFORM ?1
SUMMARY 
STATEMENT OF 
MARIO MONTI’S 
KEYNOTE 
INTRODUCTION
MARIO MONTI
Mario Monti is President of Bocconi University. 
Since February 2014 he has been Chairman of 
the High-level Group on Own Resources of the 
European Union.
He was Prime Minister of Italy (November 
2011-April 2013) and Minister of Economy and 
Finance (November 2011-July 2012).
In November 2011 he was appointed Senator for 
life by the President of the Italian Republic, Giorgio 
Napolitano.
Since May 2014 he has been a member of the 
Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.
He chairs the Council on the Future of Europe of the 
Berggruen Institute on Governance and is Honorary 
Chairman of Bruegel, the European think-tank he 
founded in 2005.
He served for ten years as a member of the European 
Commission, in charge of the Internal Market, 
Financial Services and Tax Policy (1995-1999), 
then of Competition (1999-2004).
He is the author of the report to the President of the 
European Commission on A New Strategy for the 
Single Market (May 2010).
His publications focus mainly on monetary and 
financial economics, public finance, competition 
policy, and the economic and political dimensions 
of European integration.
Born in Varese, Italy, in 1943, he graduated from 
Bocconi University and pursued graduate studies 
at Yale University. Prior to joining the European 
Commission, he had been Professor of Economics 
and Rector at Bocconi.
INTRODUCTION - THE RELEVANCE OF 
THE DEBATE TODAY
The workshop organised today by the EUI provides 
a timely opportunity to discuss the issue of own 
resources for the EU budget, even though at this 
stage in the multiannual budgetary cycle the own 
resources question would normally not be very 
high on the agenda. 
The new legislative package on own resources, 
which is part of the Multiannual Financial 
Framework package for the period 2014-2020, 
was adopted by the Council in May 2014 after 
a broad outline had already been decided on by 
the European Council in February 2013. The 
ratification procedure of the Own Resources 
decision is now ongoing. Until it can enter into 
force, the old decision remains in place and 
ensures business continuity. In terms of content, 
the new regime will be mostly a prolongation of 
the present provisions.
The Commission proposals for post-2020 
legislation will have to be tabled together with 
the new proposals for the Multiannual Financial 
Framework in approximately 2018. 
Thus, at first glance, there would actually be no 
pressing need to deal with the question of the 
financing of the budget at this point in time. At 
a comparable junction, seven years ago, it was 
rather quiet on the own resources front.
THE DIFFICULTY IN TACKLING OWN 
RESOURCES
It is easy to be cynical about the prospects for reform 
of own resources: this issue has been turned inside 
out ever since the 1980s. It has been the object of 
many different reform proposals which have failed 
to produce significant changes. The entrenched 
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institutional standpoints are well known and the 
requirement for unanimity between Member 
States gives a comparable advantage to those who 
benefit from the status quo – notably in the form 
of sizeable corrections.
Given these elements of context, is any reform 
doomed to fail? Are we in a “joint-decision trap” 
situation?
THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON OWN 
RESOURCES
The High Level Group on Own Resources was 
created in the final days of the negotiations on the 
Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 to 
further reflections and provide new input to the 
debate about the financing of the EU budget.
This shows that the negotiators were conscious 
that the revenue side of the EU budget remains 
“unfinished business” and that somehow one 
of the keys to addressing some of the budgetary 
challenges and unlocking the economic potential 
of the EU budget rests in this issue.
Moreover, the negotiators agreed to set up an 
inter-institutional group, which is all the more 
noticeable given that own resources are not 
decided under the normal legislative procedure, 
but under a special legislative procedure where 
Member States clearly have the upper hand.
The Group is composed of members designated 
by each institution, but works independently of 
them. This gives us the freedom to address all the 
issues and avenues for reform that we consider 
promising, without being harnessed by traditional 
institutional viewpoints. In parallel, there is 
constant political reporting of the Group’s work 
and own resources regularly appear in the political 
debate, in particular in the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission.
In accordance with its mandate, the Group 
produced a First Assessment Report at the end of 
2014, which was well received and will hopefully 
play a role in catalysing the discussions.
We are currently undertaking a detailed 
examination of possible candidates for own 
resources, or possible reforms of existing ones. 
At the same time, our outreach activities with 
many stakeholders are set to intensify, both at 
the European and national levels. Among these 
stakeholders, members of national parliaments 
are important, but so are interlocutors from other 
institutions, think tanks and NGOs.
A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE VARIOUS 
WORKING SESSIONS IN TODAY’S 
WORKSHOP
1. The first working session “Do we need a 
reform?” addresses the obvious question, since 
the present system has undeniably functioned in 
a satisfactory way from a sufficiency and stability 
point of view. Moreover, the fact that the system is 
mostly intergovernmental, rather than federal, will 
be considered an asset – rather than a deficiency 
– by many who want to exercise “control” over the 
EU budget.
There are some “wrong reasons” for reform and 
we should beware of using them: 
· Obviously, the reform of Own Resources 
should not serve to increase the EU budget 
through the back door. 
· A different set of revenue sources, however 
autonomous or genuine they may be, 
cannot solve certain problems on the 
expenditure side of the budget. This may 
work in a national set-up, where more 
income can lead to higher spending, but not 
in the expenditure-driven EU budget, with 
its requirement for ex-ante equilibrium. To 
spend more, we need appropriations on the 
expenditure side and relevant sufficiently 
generous MFF ceilings.
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· Similarly, the backlog of payments cannot 
be solved by simply having more revenue 
flows (like fines) if we do not have 
commensurate appropriations and ceilings.
· I would also be cautious when it comes to 
the argument that the EU revenue system 
should go back to its roots, to the 1950s 
or early 1960s, when the budget was “still” 
autonomous, as foreseen by the founding 
fathers. In those days, the volume of the 
budget and its functions were extremely 
limited (in fact, it mostly concerned 
administrative expenditure to set up the 
European institutions).
· As common policies – and thus budget 
needs – grew and multiplied (especially the 
CAP), and simultaneously trade agreements 
at the WTO worked to decrease income 
from customs duties, traditional own 
resources were set to become insufficient to 
cover the needs.
There was never a “golden past” of an autonomous 
federal budget which we could strive to revive. 
But it is also true that the current system of own 
resources is very far from the spirit of the Treaty, 
as eloquently worded decades ago, and still 
embodied in Article 311. This should remain our 
point of reference:
“The Union shall provide itself with the means 
necessary to attain its objectives and carry through 
its policies. Without prejudice to other revenue, the 
budget shall be financed by own resources.”
In this context, the present system nonetheless 
presents many flaws that justify a reform.
The First Assessment Report of the High Level 
Group on Own Resources focused on an analysis 
of the present system and was unanimously 
endorsed by the Group members. It identified at 
least four main problems:
a) The current system is too complex and non-
transparent, in particular the system of national 
rebates and the statistical VAT-based resource. 
b) Own Resources are not “genuine” for the most 
part but de facto national contributions. In 2013, 
around 83% of the Union’s revenue came directly 
from national budgets, which mainly is a result of 
the steady increase in the share of the GNI-based 
own resource since its introduction in 1988. This 
has fuelled an antagonistic debate on budgetary 
issues between net payers and net contributors, 
and has increased awareness at the national level 
of the costs of the EU budget, while the benefits 
are less visible in national budgets and less present 
in national debates. This creates a bias against 
financing EU-wide public goods.
c) An issue related to these criticisms is the 
debate about delayed payments and the increased 
difficulties in annual budgetary negotiations, as 
national fiscal difficulties and the need to respect 
the requirements of the EU Stability and Growth 
Pact have led to increasing pressure on payment 
appropriations at the EU level. Pressure on 
payments also stems from a lack of coordination 
between budgetary procedures in the Member 
States and at the EU level: requests for additional 
payments by means of Amending Budgets towards 
the end of the year are likely to encounter strong 
resistance, in particular from Member States 
where national budgetary choices for the year 
have already been made.
d) The decision-making process makes it 
extremely difficult to reform the system, since 
the 28 Member States must agree to any change. 
This problem is not new and largely explains why 
previous attempts at significant reforms have failed. 
Moreover, the issue of own resources is rarely, if 
ever, discussed politically in national parliaments, 
even though according to the treaties they are 
meant to be the ultimate holder of sovereignty on 
this issue.
The “juste-retour” dilemma would not be a 
dilemma if it could be resolved easily. However, a 
different mix of own resources (which fulfils more 
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of the assessment criteria), coupled with reforms 
on the expenditure side and possibly some 
changes in the budgetary mechanism, might help 
to rationalize our budget procedures and decision 
making. 
There is another dimension to the issue which is 
not explicitly mentioned in the First Assessment 
and which is certainly more controversial. A more 
autonomous EU budget with genuine resources 
could certainly be a major step towards a more 
supranational “federal” Union. Ideally, the Union 
would be endowed with real competence to levy 
taxes, the decisions would be made by qualified 
majority, and a fully-fledged democratic European 
Parliament would have the last word on the 
revenue as well as on the expenditure side. Central 
collection could be another step in this direction.
For a convinced federalist, this would be reason 
enough to pursue this path. A real federal 
community should have a community budget 
decided under a community method. Such a 
scenario, however, is certainly the very reason why 
many would oppose such a more autonomous 
budget. If our aim is to produce meaningful 
recommendations which can generate broad 
support among Member States, a federalist or 
integrationist offensive alone will not be sufficient 
– it could even be counterproductive under the 
present framing conditions.
Therefore, the challenge is to conceive an own 
resources reform which can be shown to have 
multiple justifications: budgetary efficiency, 
economic dividends, political integration, and 
support from citizens.
2. The second working session – entitled “which 
options for a reform?” – addresses several 
questions of substance which I find particularly 
interesting.
The first question concerns the criteria to be used 
to “score” potential future own resources. This 
seems straightforward enough in that it allows 
a systematic review of own resources, and yet it 
usefully makes the link with the expenditure side 
of the EU budget, at least in its re-distributional 
dimension. This is also what we have attempted 
to do in our First Assessment, by establishing a 
set of general criteria which are used in economic 
theory (equity/fairness; efficiency; sufficiency/
stability; transparency/simplicity; and democratic 
accountability/budgetary discipline), and a set of 
criteria more specific to the EU budget (European 
added value; respect of the subsidiarity principle; 
and limitation of political transaction costs).
I should like to underline that some criteria are 
easier to define than others. The provision of 
sufficient revenue, for example, is easily measured 
against the size of the budget. However, the 
equity criteria can be looked at, depending on 
one’s focus, from a vertical perspective (income 
re-distribution), from a horizontal perspective 
(equivalent impact on tax payers), or from the 
point of view of Member States’ ability to pay. This 
discussion is therefore not neutral and implies 
certain choices.
The second working session will also deal with the 
“governance” of the system of own resources and 
possible changes in the role of each institution. 
Should we have a modular system where Member 
States are allowed to choose options for their 
financing contribution? Should we earmark some 
revenue for some specific policies which benefit 
from broad support?
· Some ideas sound promising at first 
glance, but are very sensitive and would 
be incompatible with established budget 
doctrine. Which principles – if any – 
would we be willing to water down or 
even sacrifice? Equilibrium? Annuality? 
Universality? Unity of the Budget?
· If some type of differentiation on the 
revenue side appears to be a way forward 
so that a coalition of the willing can move 
ahead, would this not open the door 
to further fragmentation and even to a 
“Europe à la carte” on the expenditure side?
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Should we devise incentives to Member States so 
that they depart from the status quo on the fiscal 
model? Can we get around the zero-sum game by 
adopting a more strategic approach than in the 
past?
All these questions go beyond the technical 
analysis which is usually associated with own 
resources, but they are crucial to avoid repeating 
the errors made in the past. 
3. As hinted in the introduction, there is an 
acknowledgement that the current reflexion on 
own resources launched after the last multiannual 
budgetary negotiations showed a collective 
awareness that there is a need to tackle this difficult 
issue differently from the past. This is very much 
linked to the subject of the third panel on “how to 
communicate on this reform?”. The traditional 
modus operandi on own resources in past 
negotiations is that proposals for reform have been 
discussed in very technical detail among Council 
experts in direct contact with their national 
administrations. However, at the end of the game 
proposals are in fact examined against the status 
quo regarding each country’s net balance, without 
really discussing the merit of the proposals from 
the point of view of the European interest. Such 
a process is doomed to fail in a decision-making 
procedure with 28 potential vetoes. It only feeds 
the “juste-retour” rhetoric.
What can we do to get out of it?
Our positioning in the High Level Group on Own 
Resources is that communication is key, but as a 
means to convince, and as a means to put visible 
pressure on those who ultimately decide. National 
parliaments therefore need to be associated with 
the debate as early as possible in order to be 
able to contribute to it, instead of being brought 
into the loop very late, either for the final phase 
of budgetary negotiations or, for some of them, 
only during the process of ratification of the own 
resources decision.
See interview
We therefore find ourselves in a very peculiar 
situation: national parliaments are the ultimate 
sovereign of own resources, but they do not play 
a leading role in the process; at the same time, the 
European Parliament is merely consulted on the 
own resources decision, but it pushes very hard 
for a reform and considers it a central issue in the 
negotiations. If the institutional set-up cannot 
easily be changed (treaty revision), we should at 
least address the lack of involvement of national 
parliaments.
As far as broader communication is concerned, 
how far should we go? Would it be desirable to have 
a broader public debate? Or would it be exploited 
by sceptics to create an image of “Brussels as a 
bottomless pit”?
Visibility and transparency can be a double-edged 
sword: it is easy to damage the image of the EU 
budget with a little bit of anecdotal evidence, no 
matter how well or ill confirmed. Conversely, it is 
a long-term task to rebuild trust. We need good 
examples, narratives and statistics to make the 
case. In a subsidiarity system, the burden of proof 
lies at the supranational level. 
The distinguished “epistemic community” 
present here today in Florence – political actors, 
practitioners and academic observers – has a 
special role to play as multipliers of the present 
debate. I hope and expect that by the end of the 
day we will have arrived at a better understanding 
of why the situation is so protracted, and that 
some fresh ideas will have emerged on how to find 
a way out of this gridlock.
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OWN RESOURCES: 
THE NEED FOR A 
REFORM
BRIGID LAFFAN
Brigid Laffan is Director and Professor at the Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, and Director 
of the Global Governance Programme, European 
University Institute (EUI), Florence. In August 
2013, Professor Laffan left the School of Politics and 
International Relations (SPIRe) University College 
Dublin where she was Professor of European Politics. 
She was Vice-President of UCD and Principal of the 
College of Human Sciences from 2004 to 2011.
She was the founding director of the Dublin 
European Institute UCD from 1999 and in March 
2004 she was elected as a member of the Royal 
Irish Academy. She is a member of the Board of 
the Mary Robinson Foundation for Climate Justice, 
the Fulbright Commission (until September 2013) 
and was the 2013 Visiting Scientist for the EXACT 
Marie Curie Network.
In September 2014 Professor Laffan was awarded 
the UACES Lifetime Achievement Award. In 
2012 she was awarded the THESEUS Award for 
outstanding research on European Integration. In 
2010 she was awarded the Ordre national du Mérite 
by the President of the French Republic. 
The EU budget has played a major role in the 
politics and evolution of the European Union. 
The Budget Treaties of 1970 and 1975 marked an 
important federalisation of EU budgetary politics 
by granting budgetary powers to the European 
Parliament and by establishing a European system 
of ‘own resources’. The EU was never endowed 
however with sovereignty concerning taxation; 
it could neither set nor raise taxes which greatly 
limited its power. The political and conceptual drive 
behind ‘Own Resources’ was to endow the Union 
with an autonomous source of financial power 
and to weaken dependence on national budgetary 
resources. Initially ‘own resources’ consisted of 
three elements: customs duties; agricultural levies; 
and a proportion of the base used for assessing 
value-added tax (VAT) in the member states, up 
to a ceiling of 1 per cent. The 1970 agreement on 
own resources was subsequently altered a number 
of times. Over time, what are known as traditional 
‘own resources’ (customs duties on imports from 
outside the EU and sugar levies) suffered from a 
reduction in volume as successive trade rounds 
reduced tariffs on trade. Secondly, differentials 
in VAT rates meant that this source gave rise to 
a number of anomalies with the result that it was 
reduced to a uniform rate of 0.3 %  levied on the 
harmonised VAT base of each Member States. 
Traditional own resources were overcome by 
new mechanisms, namely, Member State GNI 
transfers. Initially designed to cover the balance 
of total expenditure not covered by the other own 
resources, this system has become the largest 
source of revenue of the EU budget. In other 
words, the spirit of the 1970 Budget Treaty has 
been eroded and the Union is once more reliant 
on national contributions.
See Diagram I:  Composition of EU Own Resources
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Diagram I:  Composition of EU Own Resources
The EU budget was, and remains, small in relation 
to Union gross national income (GNI), and to 
the level of public expenditure in the member 
states. In 2012, EU spending amounted to around 
€147 billion which represented 1.12 per cent of 
EU GNI and was thus much less than domestic 
budgets, which collectively represent between 
30 and 40 per cent of GNI in Europe.  Reform 
of the EU budget has been a perennial issue on 
the agenda of the EU; pressure for reform stems 
from the pattern of expenditure, the small size of 
the budget, and a complex system of rebates for 
some member states. The periodic re-negotiations 
of the Union’s multiannual financial perspective 
are always accompanied with demands for deep 
reform, particularly of ‘own resources’ with 
many arguing that a redesign of own resources is 
fundamentally necessary in the EU. The barriers 
to reform are formidable because of the need for 
unanimity among the member states. 
Notwithstanding the barriers to reform, there 
are also formidable pressures favouring reform. 
In June 2011, the Commission, when it tabled its 
budget proposal for 2014-2020, made suggestions 
concerning a tax on financial transactions, an EU 
VAT, a charge related to air transport and a share 
of auctioning revenue derived from the bloc’s 
CO2 emissions trading scheme. These proposals 
were designed to give the EU some sovereignty 
in taxation. The proposals met with trenchant 
opposition from the member states but were 
supported by the EP.  The European Parliament 
in the lead up to the 2014-2020 budgetary 
negotiations passed a number of resolutions 
favouring a redesign of the own resources system. 
In an April 2014 plenary discussion the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution on the MFF 2014-
2020 negotiations which argued: 
‘that tangible progress can only be achieved 
following an in-depth reform of the 
financing of the EU budget that should 
return to a system of genuine, clear, simple 
and fair own resources; stresses that this 
should lead to the introduction of one 
or several new own resources that will 
considerably reduce the share of GNI-
based contributions to the EU budget 
and, accordingly, the burden on national 
treasuries; reiterates its strong commitment 
to any process leading to the reform of 
the current unfair, non-transparent and 
complex system of own resources’ (EP 
Resolution 14-17 April 2014: http://
epthinktank.eu/2014/04/17/the-eu-own-
resources).
Source: European Union, 2013. From the publication EU budget 2012 Financial Report
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At the Parliament’s insistence, a High Level Group 
on Own Resources chaired by Mario Monti 
was established as part of the process leading to 
agreement on the 2014-2020 Financial Perspective. 
The Monti Group consists of members of the 
three institutions, Commission, Council and 
EP and will deliver its final report in 2016. The 
political strategy of using a High Level Group 
to analyse a very conflictual and problematic 
issue in the Union is not new. It is a classical 
device when there is deadlock to try to re-frame 
the issues and garner political and institutional 
support by deploying argument and persuasion. 
The work of the High Level Group has identified 
the limitations of the current system in its First 
Assessment Report presented in December 2014 
and makes the case for reform. Subsequently its 
task is to evaluate proposals for a new system 
according to the criteria established in the first 
report. There is a very strong case to be made for 
more autonomous EU budgetary resources and 
particularly for EU level tax not just in terms of EU 
financial power but because of the role that money 
has played in state building in the past. The old 
adage, ‘no taxation without representation’ should 
be reversed in discussion of the European Union. 
Without taxation it will be difficult to sustain 
representation at the EU level; a parliament that 
has budgetary power in relation to expenditure but 
none in relation to revenue raising is inherently 
weak.  
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ENTERING A WORLD 
OF FOOTLOOSE TAX 
BASES: CAN THE EU 
GENERATE ITS OWN 
INCOME? 
DANIEL TARSCHYS 
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 
(SIEPS) 
The content of this document is the sole responsibility 
of the author and constitutes a personal opinion.
ABSTRACT
While the expansion of domestic trade has 
generated many demands for the provision of 
public services at national, regional and local levels, 
the growth in international exchange produces 
a new logic of collective action. Export-based 
countries require many interventions abroad, in 
jurisdictions other than their own. New services 
and new forms of protection are needed, requiring 
new forms of taxation. The digital economy, with 
its long and complicated value chains, is creating 
a new fiscal landscape. Taming multinational 
corporations and ‘business-friendly’ tax havens 
requires political clout, which only strong 
international authorities can provide. In the quest 
for future EU revenue, we should look mainly for 
sources beyond the control of the Member States. 
Workshop on the Own Resources of the European 
Union 
European University Institute, Florence, 24 April 
2015 
WHAT REVENUE FOR THE EUROPEAN 
UNION? 
Decade after decade, budget round after budget 
round, the same tedious script is played out again 
and again. Supporters of European integration 
present their arguments for ‘more Europe’, 
economists repeat their lectures on the value of 
European public goods, specialised international 
bodies transmit their latest reports about urgent 
needs in response to acute crises, and the 
European Parliament continues to lambast against 
the paralysis of the Council, but the Member State 
governments remain unimpressed. With so many 
domestic interests competing for their attention, 
and large parts of their media and electorates 
sceptical of foreigners in general and Eurocrats 
in particular, they play first and foremost to 
their national audiences, which are understood 
to reward hard-nosed negotiators and reliable 
guardians of the public purse. As a consequence, 
there are few changes in the composition of the 
EU’s financial perspectives from one period to 
another. The best predictor of the next long-term 
budget for the Union is still the present one. 
The lesson from several decades of budget 
negotiations in the EU is that innovations on the 
revenue side are fiercely opposed. Even the most 
imaginative proposals by the most eminent teams 
of ‘wise persons’ are sidelined. In the first place, 
member state governments do not want to cede 
their control over any of their presently exploited 
tax bases beyond the concessions already made. 
Second, they are hostile to releasing access even 
to potential, as yet unexplored, sources of income. 
Rumours of EU misspending and the anticipated 
reactions of those threatened with new levies 
suffice to galvanise the opposition of Member 
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States. Anything reeking of direct EU taxation is 
taboo. 
Behind this firm resistance to increases in EU 
revenue, there seem to lurk several visceral 
instincts. One is the urge to defend the reserves of 
the domestic treasury. Another is apprehension of 
impacts on the national economy. Any tax wedge 
is pernicious to investments and employment, and 
especially so if there are no immediate and direct 
returns. Eventually, many funds siphoned off to the 
EU come back in the guise of payments from the 
European Union, but that is only eventually; the 
grumbles from those affected are in the present. 
And apart from domestic protests, there are also 
the constant sermons about budgetary balance 
from the Council and the European Commission. 
Finally, there are the perpetual side-glances at the 
acquired privileges of other Member States and 
at seemingly excessive remuneration levels in the 
European Union. In times of domestic austerity, 
the ‘equal pains’ and ‘equal efforts’ principles enjoy 
broad support. However much they agree on 
various European strategies at Council meetings, 
governments remain mesmerised by their own net 
balances and acquired correction gains. 
The zero-sum game appears to be locked. But 
is it true that any new revenue for the EU is a 
national loss even in the first stage, before some 
of the money returns? This paper explores a tack 
other than that of transfer of fiscal competence: 
that of finding additional EU income in virgin 
pastures where national ministers of finance have 
not yet trod and cannot tread, or can do so only 
with the greatest difficulty. In a globalising world, 
there are potential public income sources that 
are not only untapped but even untappable for 
national governments, i.e. simply beyond their 
reach because several tax bases have become 
so footloose and etheric. This is also linked to 
emerging demands for public interventions that 
cannot be satisfied at the level of individual states. 
With tax havens and widening consumer markets 
only a few clicks away, we are facing a new logic 
of collective action. This makes the stagnation of 
the EU budget even more absurd: with two billion 
smart phones dispersed around the world in the 
last seven years, we urgently need to get smarter 
about the budget for the next seven years of the 
European Union. 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
GOVERNMENT, 1815-2015 
As a preface to EU housekeeping, we might first 
take a quick look at government revenue and 
government expenditure in general. Measured 
as a proportion of GDP, the Member States’ 
public spending stands at 50.3% and their public 
income at 44% (Eurostat 2010). Compared to the 
situation in the 19th century, this is a fourfold or 
fivefold increase of the fiscal quota. From 1815 to 
1914, governments’ shares of GDP in European 
countries oscillated around 10 percent (Cardoso 
and Lains 2010). 
Following Adolph Wagner’s famous prediction of 
government growth as a consequence of economic 
development, many historians and social 
scientists have tried to understand the intricate 
causal patterns behind this evolution (for an early 
inventory of this literature, see Tarschys 1975). 
For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to 
consider two key preconditions: the growth of the 
market economy and a series of fiscal innovations. 
In an agricultural society with many households 
surviving on their own produce, there was much 
less need for collective action in all of its guises: 
infrastructure, education, social insurance 
or research. Many agencies of government 
intervention had not yet taken shape, and even 
where they started to evolve there was much less 
pressure and momentum in the public sphere than 
today. Several states spent more on military than 
on civil purposes. What set many balls rolling 
were the incipient and interlinked processes of 
industrialisation, urbanisation and commercial 
expansion. This transformation required both 
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new skills and new physical assets. Dependence 
on fickle markets produced both wealth and 
vulnerability, giving birth first to the ‘social 
question’ and eventually to many forms of social 
care, social insurance and social protection.  
In parallel with evolving demands for public 
action in the modern economy, there was also a 
transformation of fiscal instruments paving the 
way for continual government expansion. The 
incomes of early states were irregular and highly 
inelastic: tributes during military campaigns, 
extraordinary levies linked to particular events 
such as foreign assaults or the weddings of royal 
descendants, tithes, a smattering of ground 
taxes and excise duties based on the physical 
control of narrow passageways such as harbours 
or urban octrois. Goods-based extraction was 
always clumsy, necessitating the construction 
and maintenance of costly storage facilities or 
the establishment of frequently contested, and 
hence instable, attribution schemes. Guarding 
city entrances and policing markets was a labour-
intensive undertaking. Taxes in kind provided 
public spending with little flexibility. Non-fungible 
receipts were typically assigned to particular end 
users serving particular public functions. 
Monetarisation of the economy enabled the 
introduction of income taxes, but there were 
still considerable transaction costs in their 
assessment and levy. Once the two wars of the 
twentieth century had raised the level of taxation 
to permanently higher levels through Peacock-
Wiseman’s famous ‘ratchet effect’ (the wheel only 
goes in one direction), the habit of paying taxes 
and the necessary control mechanisms were firmly 
entrenched in mid-century Europe. In the second 
half of the twentieth century, there followed 
a further dramatic expansion of government, 
based chiefly on two major fiscal inventions: first, 
charges on employers for various social transfer 
schemes, pioneered by the Bismarck-Beveridge 
reforms; and second, value-added tax, which was 
first introduced in France in 1954 and is now, at 
long last, being seriously considered in the United 
States. The smooth payment of employer charges 
and the in-built control mechanisms of VAT have 
made these two forms of taxation very attractive to 
governments. Their elasticity as sources of public 
revenue is linked both to their low transaction 
costs and their low visibility (Tarschys 1988). 
Looking at the fiscal revolution in the rear mirror, 
we see a steady increase in the state’s capacity to 
extract resources from the economy. This is in 
no small measure due to recent technological 
breakthroughs in the sphere of payments. 
Monetarisation gave the decisive push, but much 
followed later through the gradual rationalisation 
of transfer streams. The introduction of compulsory 
cash registers and compulsory receipts made 
fiscal evasion more difficult. With money flows 
increasingly digitalised, it became much easier 
for the fiscal authorities to exercise control and to 
see to it that an appropriate trickle was diverted 
to the state. Both tax-payers “rendering unto the 
emperor what is due to him”, as quoted by Mark 
(12:12) and Matthew (22:21), and supervision by 
the authorities of such streams can now largely be 
managed by appropriate computer programs. The 
fiscal reach of the state has thus been significantly 
extended through the transformation of the 
economy, and extraction costs have been pushed 
down to minimal fractions of the various levies.  
It can hardly be underscored enough that the 
common denominator of these two processes has 
been the unprecedented expansion of economic 
exchange. The modern state is inextricably linked 
to the market economy: it is a precondition no 
less than a product. Innumerable public inputs 
are required to keep this machine humming, 
but equally countless are its taxable outputs, 
which make modern government fundable 
and affordable. In the remarkable European 
literature on the potentials and complexities of 
this model, from Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
(1776) and Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Ideen zu 
einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des 
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Staates zu bestimmen (1792) to Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte’s Der geschlossene Handelsstaat (1800) 
and Friedrich List’s Das nationale System der 
politischen Ökonomie (1840) to Émile Durkheim’s 
De la division du travail social (1893), there are 
several different views about the desirable external 
boundaries of the modern trading state, but there 
is fundamental agreement that the expanding 
exchange of labour, goods and services has 
revolutionised the human condition and set new 
parameters for our economies. 
THE GOVERNANCE OF EXPORT-BASED 
ECONOMIES
The expansion of trade was, for a long time, 
essentially a domestic phenomenon. Even in the 
age of mercantilism and the heyday of colonial 
expansion, the share of external trade remained 
modest. It is only in the last few decades that we 
have seen a major increase in exports and imports. 
The GDP fraction of these flows in the national 
economy depends very much on the size of the 
state. The trans-national trade of Luxembourg 
is explicably greater than that of Sweden, which, 
in turn, is greater than that of the United States. 
But if we look closer at subunits, the trend is 
clear enough. In America, it was not the least the 
expansion of interstate commerce that increased 
the demand for federal intervention, a need 
foreseen in the constitution, and then endlessly 
contested in the US Supreme Court. 
If trade in general generates multiple needs for 
collective action, foreign trade in particular spawns 
demands for much more collective action abroad. 
Increasing economic interdependence has many 
facets, ranging from security to environmental 
concerns, health care to education, labour 
market rules to consumer protection. With the 
many expanding flows of goods and services, the 
residents of one country have become increasingly 
exposed to and dependent on the actions or 
inactions of other countries, controlled by 
governments over which they have no immediate 
democratic control. And foreign bureaucracies are 
only one part of the story. Even more powerful in 
the globalised economy are huge multinational 
corporations, which smoothly and skilfully 
exploit the fragmentation of political authority 
among states. While there have been many good 
reasons for deregulation in previously ossified 
economies, this process has also deprived modern 
governments of some traditional instruments 
of power and revealed the relative impotence of 
small states. 
The globalisation of our economies and the many 
concomitant processes of internationalisation 
transform not only demands for collective action, 
but also its supply. How can we exert influence 
in societies other than our own? The classic 
techniques of intergovernmental diplomacy do not 
lead very far. There are occasions when embassies 
and consular staff can intervene on behalf of their 
compatriots, and a wealth of intergovernmental 
conventions lend support to such assistance. Firms 
in trouble in foreign markets get some assistance in 
similar ways. Yet there are strict limits to the logic of 
bilateral action. Many of the emerging challenges 
can be dealt with only by legal assistance abroad 
or through joint organisations and competence 
conferred on super-governmental agencies. 
Where regulatory intervention is required, the 
loopholes and opportunities for evasion are simply 
too large if one country after another tries to go 
it alone. When markets reach an advanced stage 
of globalisation, with producers and consumers 
spread over many continents, with value chains 
increasingly intricate and complex, with polluters, 
criminals, germs and other threats to the public 
order widely dispersed throughout the world, the 
option of regulatory Alleingang simply fades away. 
It is joint action, or no action at all. 
All of these challenges cannot be met through 
the European Union, but some can be, and many 
others must be, faute de mieux, even if the prospects 
for success are very limited. Its shortcomings and 
failures notwithstanding, the Union is still the best 
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instrument we have, and in many circumstances 
a necessary substitute or starter engine for the 
global cooperation that we have not yet managed 
to build up. But the strong and growing demand 
for EU action still does not solve the crucial 
problem of funding. If, in some corners of their 
minds, governments certainly understand the 
need for more collective resources, many other 
instincts and impulses inexorably lead them in a 
different direction, and so does their experience 
of past spending in the European Union. Just as 
every government cherishes some aspects of the 
EU record, each one has its own supply of horror 
stories of waste and errors in EU spending: mainly 
by other countries, but also sometimes by its own. 
REFORMING EU REVENUE: EARLIER 
PROPOSALS
A long list of options have been put forward as 
new income sources for the European Union. The 
Schreyer proposals of 2004 included a tax rate on 
energy consumption limited to motor fuel for road 
transport, a slice of national VAT and a corporate 
income tax. The Lamassoure report of 2007 (A6-
0066/2007 Final) presented the following as key 
candidates for new revenue: 
· VAT 
· Excise duties on motor fuel for transport and 
other energy taxes 
· Excise duties on tobacco and alcohol 
· Taxes on corporate profits. 
In addition, it listed a number of other income 
sources that had been advanced in European 
Parliament discussions: 
· Taxes on dealings in securities 
· Taxes on transport or telecommunications 
services 
· Income tax 
· Withholding tax on interest 
· ECB profits (seigniorage) 
· Ecotax 
· Taxes on currency transactions 
· Taxes on savings 
· Taxes on financial transactions (Tobin tax). 
At the request of the European Council, the 
Commission Budget Review of 2010 identified 
six areas for potential new own resources 
[COM(2010)700]: 
· A financial transaction tax (FTT) or a financial 
activities tax (FAT) 
· Auctioning of revenue from the EU emission 
trading system (ETS) 
· A new VAT resource 
· A charge on air transport 
· An energy tax or levy 
· An EU corporate income tax. 
In 2011, the Commission came forward with 
a new proposal as part of its MFF package 
(COM(2011)510 final, 871 final/2). This included 
a reform of the legal architecture intended to 
facilitate more flexible decision-making on 
technical aspects and implementation rules, as 
well as a streamlining of the various corrections. 
The Commission also proposed a single EU VAT 
rate of 1 percent on all goods and services. Among 
the two available alternatives for extracting 
resources from the financial sector it opted for the 
FTT, but met with strong resistance from several 
member states. The possibility of introducing such 
a tax for a limited number of countries in the form 
of enhanced cooperation is still being explored.
The latest contribution to this discussion is the 
‘first assessment report’, released on 17 December 
2014 by the High Level Group on Own Resources 
(HLGOR). A key conclusion here is that it is very 
difficult to analyse the revenue side in isolation: “A 
necessary pre-condition for change is the common 
understanding and acknowledgement that the EU 
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budget, and indeed the EU as a whole, is much 
more than a zero-sum game – financially as well 
as politically. This is the only positive and rallying 
argument that can create a concerted ambition for 
reform and merge national interests with a higher 
European interest.”
This point is important. Looking at previous 
blueprints for revenue reform, one is struck by 
their timidity. The advocates of new solutions go to 
great lengths to underline the ‘neutrality’ of their 
proposals. The idea is not to collect more money 
for the EU, but simply to introduce more efficiency, 
transparency, solidarity and consistency into the 
revenue side of the budget. This argument is clearly 
intended not to antagonise the many governments 
opposed to an increase in EU expenditure, but 
it is far too conservative. Embedded in this 
cautious approach is the question of why do we 
need reform in the first place? If the purpose is 
merely redistribution within a given quantitative 
framework, we might expect responses largely 
along the predictable lines of net balances and 
juste retour. 
IN SEARCH OF GREENER PASTURES
The full drama of the events unfolding before 
our eyes may not yet be clear, but in the last few 
decades we have experienced momentous changes 
in the world economy requiring many more 
public interventions than we have as yet been able 
to define. If the expansion of economic exchange 
in domestic settings called for a large number 
of new collective actions at the local, regional 
and national levels, the same is now true in a 
wider trans-national setting. With export quotas 
ranging between 20 and 50 percent, the European 
countries and their social and economic actors 
have become much more dependent on collective 
action abroad, in jurisdictions other than their 
own. Climate change, pollution, refugee streams, 
tourism, contagious diseases, the flow of data and 
the rise of multinational corporations are just 
some of the related factors and processes rendering 
previous forms of protection woefully insufficient 
and inadequate. The demands for transnational 
regulatory interventions and other defensive 
measures and public services are widening into 
many new areas; the adjustment of supply is slowly 
following suit. An obvious bottleneck is the weak 
funding of such broader collective action. 
Raising resources for the collective needs of the 
trade-dependent economy requires, first of all, 
a better understanding of our new predicament, 
hence the need for more and better policy analysis 
in general and, in particular, attention to emerging 
new services and payment models attuned to the 
digital age. The explosive growth of business on the 
net would not have been possible without a wide 
field of such innovations, but there are few signs 
of similar creativity in the public sector. Much of 
the haggling over EU resources seems to be based 
on the assumption that there is a pie that can be 
shared only this way or that way, whereas in reality 
the total pie is anything but fixed. Expanding 
trade provides resources that did not exist before. 
By the same token, there are potential sources of 
fiscal revenue that can be tapped only when trade 
patterns expand and some trans-national public 
authority is strong enough to secure its share of 
the gains. 
The guiding principle, then, should be to phase out 
the tug-of-war between the Union and its Member 
States over already-exploited tax bases. Some 
sharing of such resources may still be necessary in 
the future, but the focus for the EU should be on 
fresh receipts from activities immediately linked to 
the process of Europeanisation and globalisation. 
We should seek to identify sources of public 
revenue that are not easily or not at all within the 
reach of national governments, but come about 
or become available only through international 
exchange and cooperation. A small fraction of such 
gains could quite reasonably and even profitably 
be mobilised to pay for the collective action that 
is its necessary concomitant and precondition. 
The practical difficulties linked to this approach 
are considerable, not least because of the many 
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competing jurisdictions vying to offer favourable 
conditions to business. However, the combined 
strength of further investments in policy analysis, 
a judicious use of the legal instruments of the 
European Union and a mobilised public opinion 
should not be underrated. With enough pressure, 
the veto power of resistant ‘business-friendly’ 
member states practising tax competition will 
yield. 
Tax competition has also allowed some potential 
objects of taxation to pass under the radar. As 
fiscal systems undergo all kinds of ‘greening’, a 
spectacular exception is that of aviation fuel. One 
reason for this is no doubt the lobbying strength 
of the airlines, but this industry also predicted 
doom and gloom in its earlier battle for tax-free 
sales without being hit too hard by the measures 
eventually taken. When it comes to fuel, the 
industry threatens to re-source purchases to evade 
taxation, but transport costs reduce the possible 
harm of that option. 
Many of the more promising footloose tax bases 
are connected to the activities of multinational 
corporations. It is important not to demonise 
these actors. Multinationals have played and 
continue to play a preeminent role in technology 
transfer and economic development in all corners 
of the globe. The historic breakthrough in poverty 
reduction in recent decades would have been 
impossible without their thrust and momentum. 
Both multinational companies and their national 
counterparts are tightly dependent on public 
action, and their expansion is intertwined with 
that of state expansion. In small open European 
economies, the GDP share of government 
and the GDP share of foreign trade have both 
quadrupled over the last century. While national 
and multinational companies are both dependent 
on domestic public investment, transfers and 
services, the latter are in a much better position 
to be free riders. Many of the countermeasures 
required to set the record straight call for more 
resolute trans-frontier cooperation.
Corporate taxes in Europe have come down from 
around 35 percent in the mid-nineties to around 
23 percent now, on average. The span is very wide, 
however, with Bulgaria and Ireland at the bottom 
and mainly the larger states at the top. Country 
size seems to put a brake on the race to the bottom. 
If this is true, a jurisdiction of 500 million would 
probably be more resilient to competitive pressure 
than smaller states.
THE EARLY STEPS OF BEPS 
Important initiatives against fiscal competition 
have been taken within the OECD, especially 
in the programme on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS). A first set of recommendations 
was endorsed in 2014 by the Finance Ministers of 
the G20. The 15 actions included the promotion 
of greater fiscal transparency between states, 
measures against the abuse of transfer pricing 
and action against ‘hybrid mismatches’. These are 
cross-border arrangements that take advantage 
of differences in the tax treatment of financial 
instruments, asset transfers and entities to achieve 
‘double non-taxation’ or long-term deferral 
outcomes which may not have been intended by 
either country. BEPS is at an early stage, but has the 
potential to pave the way for important advances 
in the next few years.
The major business consultancy firms offer 
advice on ‘value chain management’ and tax 
optimisation. The European Commission has long 
had corporate tax avoidance on its agenda and is 
now an active participant in the BEPS process. The 
revision of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in 2014 
was intended to prevent companies from using 
mismatches in national tax regimes to avoid taxes. 
The Commission’s competition investigations into 
tax rulings and scrutiny of patent boxes under the 
Code of Conduct on Harmful Business Taxation 
are also aimed at countering unfair tax regimes in 
Member States. In March 2015, it presented a tax 
transparency package intended to increase the flow 
of automatic information between member states. 
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In a comment, Pierre Moskovici said, “Tolerance 
has reached rock bottom for companies that 
avoid paying their fair share of taxes, and for the 
regimes that enable them to do this. We have to 
rebuild the link between where companies really 
make their profits and where they are taxed. To 
do this, Member States need to open up and work 
together. That is what today’s Tax Transparency 
Package aims to achieve.”
Meanwhile, the European Parliament has also 
stepped up its activity in this field. Following the 
Lux Leak scandal, it created a temporary committee 
on tax rulings led by Alain Lamassoure. Although 
the mandate is only for six months, there is every 
reason to believe that the legislators’ interest will 
persist, as will the cooperation between the OECD 
and the European Commission. The impact of the 
efforts by taxation professionals in recent years is 
already sizable 
STANDING UP TO MONOPOLIES AND 
OLIGOPOLIES
Another area in which sovereign states experience 
limitations in their reach and clout is that of 
consumer protection. Apart from banks ‘too big 
to fail’, the modern world also has actors that are 
‘too big to jail’, or too distant. Software giants such 
as Google are difficult to come to grips with, both 
on competition matters and on issues of data 
protection and personal integrity. “The right to be 
forgotten” has been proclaimed by the company, 
but whether this promise is being kept is hard 
to ensure with as yet inexistent instruments of 
international monitoring and supervision.
Recent EU measures have aimed at capping 
roaming charges on mobile telephones and charges 
on credit card transactions. The nominal gains for 
EU consumers are impressive, but the final results 
remain to be established after a further analysis of 
the subsequent incidence. Major companies are 
unlikely to absorb such shocks without strenuous 
efforts to shift the burden forwards, backwards 
or sideways. Nevertheless, interventions in 
monopolistic and oligopolistic markets seem 
promising and can no doubt confer important 
benefits on taxpayers.
Apart from price-related interventions in the 
interests of consumers, there are many needs for 
health protection in mass markets. End users may 
have more confidence in controls exercised near 
the point of sale, but other factors may favour 
shifting the point of gravity further up the value 
chain, to the locus of production. If governments 
can arrange for the funding of such operations, 
there may be considerable efficiency gains in store. 
Other control demands are more altruistic, such as 
the desire to ensure safe and fair labour conditions 
in distant supplier countries. 
TAXATION IN A DIGITAL ECONOMY 
A major social transformation underway is the 
marriage of the World Wide Web with new models 
of production, distribution and consumption. Its 
impact on taxation has already been dramatic, in 
that governments’ extractive capacity has gone 
up while their extraction costs have gone down. 
However, a menace threatening on the horizon 
is a loss of territorial control. If money can move 
around at a click, so can legal instruments and 
immaterial assets of all kinds. A new era of fiscal 
mobility seems to be dawning. There is every 
reason to predict that private actors wishing to 
exploit these new opportunities will prove more 
agile and inventive than the heavy-footed fiscal 
authorities following on their trail.
The new European Commission has recognised 
this development and placed the digital economy 
at the top of its political agenda. VAT coordination 
goes a long way back in the Union, with the Sixth 
VAT Directive in 1977 and the 2006 Council 
Directive on VAT as important milestones, 
but new issues crop up all the time. In its BEPS 
action plan, the OECD also gives a great deal of 
attention to this field. In the last year, the ECJ has 
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been wrestling with the taxation of business in 
bitcoins. A special report (OECD 2014) addresses 
“the tax challenges of the digital economy”. A 
recent seminar organised by one of the leading 
consultancy firms dealt with “tax governance and 
tax risk management in a post-BEPS world”.
The full consequences of this development are 
not yet discernible, but there is little doubt that 
new threats to the sovereign state will emerge 
even in the short-to-medium term, and that 
larger political jurisdictions, such as the European 
Union, are in a much better position to tackle 
these matters than smaller ones. An interesting 
precedent is provided by the United States, 
where the global reach of the tax authorities has 
increased substantially in recent years through the 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), 
with concomitant risks both for its own innocents 
abroad and for its trading partners. The ongoing 
negotiations on TTIP and various related trade 
flows offer additional evidence that size matters in 
the formation of regulatory frameworks for global 
business relations. 
CONCLUSION: FREEWARE, PAYWARE, 
TAXWARE 
The World Wide Web started less than 25 years ago. 
Apps began appearing less than 5 years ago. Bliss 
is it in this dawn to be alive: never have we seen a 
greater supply of free lunches. But for how long? To 
survive in the digital age, content producers must 
find reliable paths from freeware or shareware to 
payware. This task is now being tackled in many 
ingenious ways, with a steady stream of new 
payment models appearing in different branches 
of the economy. There are already millions of apps 
available in the major app stores, with purchases 
often taking place once the fly has come into 
the spider’s parlour (‘apps in apps’). Offering 
‘premium services’ to customers tired of the ads 
and the slow pace of the free versions is a standard 
device. Online newspapers publish blurbs for free, 
but request payment for the full texts. 
Governments have much to learn from this huge 
wave of innovations. They face a similar dilemma. 
The provision of collective action is difficult to 
fund while there are so many opportunities to 
enjoy substantial benefits without footing the bill. 
Free riders abound. Governments’ long struggle 
with this problem is written into our fiscal history. 
Gateways have often been erected to facilitate the 
collection of fees or taxes. When indivisibility 
appears at the international level, we must very 
carefully explore the potential direct links between 
the particular services (including regulations) 
and the added value they provide. In some cases, 
trickles may be diverted from massive payment 
streams with relative ease; in others, the technical 
obstacles are substantial and not yet superseded. 
To sum up, the most promising sources of EU 
funding are not in further fractions of the already-
exploited tax bases that may be wrenched from 
recalcitrant Member State governments in future 
negotiations. A much better strategy is to aim 
for tax bases that are, more or less, beyond the 
reach of individual states and accessible only by 
joint action. Some of these sources are tappable 
only if the Union is strong enough to confront the 
states that are its fiscal competitors and the non-
state actors that have become such experienced 
masters of fiscal evasion. Many of these tax bases 
are linked to the emerging digital economy. While 
much remains to be done to explore these reserves, 
design appropriate interventions and refine the 
technology of extraction, there is promise of ample 
rewards if a greater proportion of the volumes 
traded can be converted into taxware. Pushing in 
this direction would make the European Union far 
more sustainable than it is today and could finally 
provide it with ‘own resources’ that are truly its 
own. 
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ABSTRACT
The debate on the EU budget and its reform should 
not be prisoner to (only) technical arguments. The 
formation, composition and use of the budget 
are not only politically salient questions, but they 
imply also an idea of what the EU is and should 
be. If financing of EU activities is based on the 
principal of the fiscal sovereignty of its Member 
States, this principle does not seem to fit the need 
of the Eurozone to use autonomous resources 
for anti-cyclical purposes. This article argues 
that the principle of national fiscal sovereignty 
is compatible with the EU as an association of 
states, while it is not compatible with a Eurozone 
operating as a union of states. A differentiated 
strategy for the reform of the system of own 
resources of the EU should thus be adopted.
Key words: EU own resources, fiscal sovereignty, 
euro budget, association of states, union of states.
INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) is a political system 
based on the principle of representation without 
taxation. Since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the EU has 
been institutionalized around a double principle 
of representation: representing the member states 
as political entities in the Council of Ministers 
(then only the Council); and representing the 
European citizens in the European Parliament 
(EP). This double principle of representation was 
celebrated by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, according to 
which the approval of a European law (regulation 
or directive) by both the Council and the EP 
constitutes the ordinary legislative procedure of 
the Union. Although the regulatory powers and 
policy competences of the EU have increased 
dramatically, the EU system of own resources 
to support these powers and responsibilities has 
not changed accordingly. The budget of the EU 
is strictly constrained in statutory terms (around 
1.23 percent of the total Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of the EU Member States), comes mainly 
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from national transfers (around 85 per cent of the 
total budget), is regulated by automatic criteria 
(in order to prevent negotiation between Member 
States), and the composition of its expenditure is 
fixed and in any case negotiated between national 
governments. The EU budget is dependent on 
mathematical rather than political criteria. The EU 
has been prevented from raising autonomous taxes, 
while its policy responsibilities have dramatically 
increased. Although the definition of the budget 
is the business of the national governments 
coordinating within the EU intergovernmental 
institutions (the Council and European Council), 
its management also involves the supranational 
institutions of the Commission and the EP. But 
not across the board.
Indeed, the Commission and the EP contribute to 
the use of the budget for the regulatory policies 
of the single market, but they are marginal (the 
EP) or instrumental (the Commission) in the 
policy-making of those areas of EU activities 
traditionally close to core state powers (Genschell 
and Jachtenfuchs 2014), such as foreign and 
defence policies, home affairs, employment and 
welfare policies and – crucial to the argument 
of this article – the economic policy side of the 
Eurozone (or Economic and Monetary Union, 
or EMU). The EU emerging from the dramatic 
transformations induced first by the end of the 
Cold War and then by the existential crisis of the 
euro collapse is no longer a unitary organization, 
encompassing Member States moving towards 
the same end but at different speeds as it has been 
generally assumed(Piris 2012) . In particular, the 
separation of the legal bases and material interests 
between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone Member 
States has transformed the EU into a crossroads of 
multiple unions (Fabbrini S. 2015a). Within the 
EU, there is a union interpreted as an economic 
community – an exclusive commercial regime or an 
association of states set up through treaties aiming 
to create a common and then a single market. As 
an association of states, it is dependent on the 
principle of national fiscal sovereignty, a principle 
that makes the nation states become Member 
States the indisputable principals of the Union. At 
the same time, however, the institutionalization of 
the EU, and in particular the adoption of a single 
currency managed within a specific governance 
regime (the Economic and Monetary Union or 
EMU), has created the necessity of a more genuine 
economic and monetary union within the EU 
(Van Rompuy et al. 2012). The depth of integration 
pursued by the Eurozone during the euro crisis, 
in particular through intergovernmental treaties 
external to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, has radically 
called into question the very idea of an association 
of states. In particular, the Eurozone is a union 
of states, although its institutional structure and 
policy competence divisions have evidenced a lack 
of effectiveness and legitimacy.
It is against this differentiated institutional 
background that the debate on the reform of the 
EU system of own resources should take place. 
The level, the source and the composition of 
the budget are not only the result of the path-
dependent logic institutionalized along the course 
of the integration process. The EU budget is much 
more than an accounting document. It is a realm 
of political confrontation between rival views of 
the EU, both as an organization and a project. 
For those national governments favouring or 
supporting the perspective of the EU as an 
economic community (like the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Sweden and eastern European Member 
States such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria), the current 
features of the system of own resources must be 
preserved, given that it reflects the idea of the 
EU as an association of states, whose Member 
States should maintain control of its functioning 
(and thus of its financing). At the same time, the 
political development of the EU has gone so far 
that it can no longer be considered an economic 
community. The EU has indeed acquired features 
of a domestic federal system, in particular in 
the Eurozone, moving from the regulatory 
competences of the single market to policy 
responsibilities in sensitive new areas of activity. 
This is why supranational institutions like the EP 
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and the Commission, and also the Member States 
of a Eurozone that has performed unsatisfactorily, 
claim the necessity of reforming the system of own 
resources, and in particular call into question the 
principle of national fiscal sovereignty through 
the creation of a fiscal capacity for the Eurozone, 
even if that requires a change to the treaties. For 
these institutional actors and Member States, the 
Eurozone will either evolve towards a democratic 
union of states or will risk a political implosion. 
In short, the debate on the EU budget and its 
reform should not be prisoner to (only) technical 
arguments. The formation, composition and use 
of the budget are not only highly politically salient 
questions, but they imply an idea of what the EU is 
and should be. Here, I will proceed as follows: first, 
I will critically describe the current system of EU 
own resources; second, I will discuss the various 
proposals for reform, basing my discussion on the 
work initiated by the High Level Group on Own 
Resources (HLGOR) chaired by Mario Monti. 
Finally, in the Conclusion, I will bring home my 
main argument. 
THE EU SYSTEM OF OWN RESOURCES 
The EU budget is formally constituted by a system 
of own resources. The concept of own resources 
implies that EU revenues should not be dependent 
on discretionary decisions of the Member States. 
However, this is not the case. I will first consider 
the revenue side and then the expenditure side 
of the EU system of own resources, with the aim 
of showing its dependence on Member State 
governments (Cipriani 2014; Iozzo, Micossi and 
Salvemini 2008).
Starting with the revenue side, there are three 
types of own resources: (1) traditional own 
resources (TOR), deriving from customs duties 
and agricultural levies; (2) VAT-based resources, 
consisting in contributions by the Member States 
calculated on the basis of a hypothetical value 
added tax base, which is then corrected in variously 
ways; and (3) GNI-based (Gross National Income) 
resources, which are the crucial source for 
balancing the budget. If one considers the trend 
over the last fifteen years (Fuest, Heinemann and 
Ungerer 2015), it emerges that the GNI resources 
have increased dramatically, whereas the TOR and 
the VAT resources have either decreased or only 
slightly increased.
On the expenditure side, the EU budget has mainly 
been used to support agricultural subsidies (40 
per cent), despite the agricultural sector having 
become marginal in the economic structure of the 
main Member States, and regional and structural 
policies (around 40 per cent), considered necessary 
offsetting measures for those economically under-
developed sub-national regions that would 
be penalized by the deepening of the single 
market. The remaining fifth of the budget is 
used to support the regulatory policies (like the 
competition policy) and the daily operation of the 
EU administration.
On both the revenue and expenditure sides, the EU 
budget exhibits controversial features. Regarding 
the revenue side, it has become growingly 
dependent on GNI contributions – that is, national 
transfers – currently representing around 85 per 
cent of the total EU budget. At the same time, the 
GNI contributions are not exactly proportional 
to the real national income of each Member State 
because of a complex mathematical calculation 
and the need to take into consideration specific 
national rebates (as in the case of the UK). This 
has created a quite unfair system of distribution of 
financial weight between Member States. 
In proportional terms, in 2013 the main 
contributors were such Member States as Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Malta. As for the four largest and 
richest Member States, the UK contributed much 
less than Italy, France and Germany. Calculating 
the net balance for each Member State – i.e. the 
difference between the expenditure allocated to 
the Member State and its national contribution – 
the outcome is not surprising. 
The poorer member states get more than they give 
and the richer member states give more than they 
get. But (again) the UK has a significantly smaller 
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net margin than the other three larger countries.
Regarding the revenue side, it seems evident that 
the EU does not spend much on policies generating 
European public goods – i.e. policies generating 
trans-national benefits – but rather on policies 
tailored for specific Member States or sub-national 
regions. In particular, it seems unjustifiable to 
spend a large share of the budget on the agriculture 
sector (a traditional French request), given its 
declining importance in economic and social 
terms (even in France). Certainly, agriculture is 
an activity with cultural implications, inasmuch 
as it also connotes the values of healthy nutrition 
and preservation of the landscape. And of course, 
farmers were historically the backbone of anti-
modernizing, if not authoritarian, forces, and 
thus deserve a specific consideration to reduce 
their fear or anxiety in relation to economic 
progress and technological innovation. However, 
this preoccupation has been dispelled by the 
post-war economic development of the Western 
European countries. At the same time, it is true 
that cohesion and regional policies have been 
successful in compensating the potential losers 
from the single market, operating as a sort of 
territorial welfare state (Leonardi 2005). However, 
the institutionalization of these policies has led to a 
pork-barrel logic in the distribution of funds, with 
the consequence that financial support has also 
been allocated to regions within richer Member 
States that do not need it (as in the famous case 
of the funds transferred to the German lander of 
Brandenburg to build drinking water reservoirs 
– plausibly a trade-off with France for the funds 
transferred to the agricultural sector).
Thus, on both the revenue and expenditure sides 
the EU budget is defined and controlled by the 
Member State governments. They negotiate to 
define the national transfers to Brussels and to get 
their share of expenditure from those transfers, 
although the negotiations are kept within strict 
limits because of the fear of opening a Pandora’s 
box. The institutional decision-making system 
has been tailored to protect the primacy of 
the Member State governments. Consider the 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which 
structures the EU system of own resources and 
from which the annual budgets are derived. The 
first draft of the MFF is informally defined by 
the Member States in the European Council, 
and formally by the Council. Although the MFF 
requires subsequent approval by the EP, the first 
draft pre-constitutes the margins for manoeuvre 
of the latter. Moreover, the MFF has a seven-year 
lifespan, thus bypassing the five-year mandate of 
the EP. Even symbolically, the lifespan of the MFF 
shows the secondary role of the EP in budgetary 
policy. The interstate negotiations concerning the 
MFF delimit the size of the annual budget, which 
in its turn is distributed to various pre-established 
programmes. The reliance on pre-established 
programmes for spending the EU budget further 
constrains the possibility of the EP using it for new 
policies or to introduce anti-cyclical measures. 
This explains why the EU budget finances more 
redistributive policies with national implications 
than trans-national policies aimed at generating 
Europe-wide goods. Although the definition of the 
MFF is constrained by pre-established numerical 
criteria, when, however, divisions emerge they 
reflect inter-state rather than partisan cleavages.
The EU system of own resources has been the 
object of recurrent criticism. On the revenue side, 
it is true that its automaticity protects the budget 
from a Member State requesting to renegotiate it in 
order to reduce its contribution. It is also true that 
this automaticity hides the political responsibility 
in the definition of the budget, making the entire 
process opaque and technical. The calculation 
of VAT-based resources is an example of such 
opaqueness. The VAT system differs significantly 
from one Member State to another, with unfair 
implications regarding their contributions to the 
total budget. The UK rebate, being calculated on 
the British VAT pool, makes the system nearly 
unintelligible. 
On the expenditure side, no EU institution seems 
accountable for the use of the own resources. 
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To be sure, for those policies decided with the 
Community method (because of its monopoly 
of legislative initiative, the Commission submits 
a legislative proposal to the Council, which votes 
by qualified majority or unanimity, and to the 
EP, which votes by absolute majority, with the 
possibility of a conciliation process in the case of 
divergences between the two legislative institutions 
(Dehousse 2011)) citizens can reconstruct the 
responsibility of the various institutional actors. 
However, also for those policies where the co-
decisional procedure is applied, the two legislative 
chambers operate within the limits of the resources 
previously allocated to a given programme. It is true 
that in the single market area many of the policies 
have a regulatory character (Majone 2014), thus 
implying limited costs. However, at the end of the 
day the citizens are prevented from understanding 
the entire budgetary process. They do not know 
the financial contribution of their country to the 
EU (no percentage for an EU tax appears when 
they pay VAT on purchases in their country), 
they cannot affect the size of the pre-established 
distribution of the own resources through their 
vote for the EP, and they cannot know who should 
be considered responsible for policy outcomes. 
This seems inevitable in a dual decision-making 
budgetary regime: it is mainly intergovernmental 
on the revenue side (the MFF is decided by the 
Council after consultation with the EP and then 
approved for the part concerning the national 
contribution by the parliament of each Member 
State), but also supranational on the expenditure 
side (but only where a co-decisional procedure 
is applied, as in the single market policies). 
Nevertheless, on the expenditure side the EP and 
the Commission have to operate within financial 
limits defined by the Member State governments.
In short, the budgetary system of the EU has five 
basic features. First, it is a derivative system. It is 
called a system of own resources, but in fact it 
is a system of Member State resource transfer. It 
is a system which gives each Member State the 
incentive to calculate the presumed trade-off 
between financial transfers to the EU and funds 
received from the EU (the net balance). Second, it 
is a rigid system. In order to prevent the re-opening 
of negotiations between Member States, the result 
of which would be unpredictable, automatic rules 
have been introduced to calculate the national 
contributions on the basis of VAT-based and GNI 
quantitative criteria. This rigidity is protected 
by the unanimous vote required for any change. 
Third, it is a restricted system. Given the nation-
based structure of the budget, the condition of the 
national economy and the level of fiscal burdens 
in the Member States will inevitably affect their 
willingness to contribute to the EU budget. Any 
proposal to increase the budget has regularly met 
insurmountable hurdles. Fourth, it is a limited 
system. The EU budget does not envisage any 
significant resource for anti-cyclical purposes, 
which would be crucial in times of crisis. Fifth, 
it is a nation-based system. The EU budgetary 
system respects the principle of exclusive national 
fiscal sovereignty. It is not tailored according to 
EU policies, but according to national interests 
and priorities. 
PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM OF THE EU 
BUDGET
In the context of the discussion on the MFF for the 
period 2014-2020, a High Level Group on Own 
Resources (HLGOR), chaired by previous Italian 
Prime Minister Mario Monti, has been established 
“with the purpose of continuing the reflection and 
providing new input to this sensitive and difficult 
issue when it comes to reforming it”. The HLGOR 
had a basic choice to make at the very start of 
its work: to devise a reform within the existing 
treaties or to call for a systemic overhaul of the 
current system, implying a change in the treaties. 
The HLGOR has chosen the former option, 
although it has acknowledged the plausibility of 
the latter one (“the discontent with the system has 
created a new dynamic which may lead to change 
in a medium-term perspective, if the political 
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conditions permit”, HLGOR: 7). The HLGOR 
has adopted a realistic and pragmatic approach, 
recognizing that the system has fundamentally 
worked in supporting the operation of the EU. 
Its report positively evaluates the current GNI-
based national transfer balancing system because 
it guarantees the “stability and sufficiency of 
resource flows” (HLGOR: 12). At the same time, 
it criticizes the process of national rebates and 
the calculation of statistical VAT-based resources 
because it is unfair (66 per cent of the UK’s net 
balance is reimbursed) and non-transparent. The 
report also recognizes that reliance on national 
resources might generate undesirable outcomes in 
times of crisis. Given the constraints of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), in difficult times reliance 
on national transfers might incentivise delayed 
payments to the EU, jeopardizing the viability of 
established programmes.
On these bases, the report advances proposals 
to identify specific resources that the EU may 
obtain independently of the Member States (e.g. 
from financial transactions), to change the VAT-
based resource calculation, and to experiment 
with a limited EU debt to use anti-cyclically. 
More generally, the HLGOR proposals aim to 
constrain narrow national self-interests and 
to limit political transaction costs in Member 
State negotiations. In a context where powerful 
pressures for the repatriation and renegotiation 
of EU policy competences are active, the HLGOR 
stresses the functionality of the current system. 
As it acknowledges, “budgetary discipline is 
currently ensured by several fundamental features 
of the EU financing system: the ceiling (which is 
the absolute limit), the fact that the EU budget 
must be in balance (no debt), and the existence 
of a Multiannual Financial Framework which 
defines maximum expenditure in the mid-term. 
As with democratic accountability, budgetary 
discipline stems from the EU’s overall institutional 
architecture and the provisions of the Treaty” 
(HLGOR: 31). The HLGOR approach aims to 
rationalize the current system of own resources. 
As discussed in the scholarly literature (Bordignon 
and Scabrosetti 2015), several measures might be 
adopted to make the system more transparent 
or less intergovernmental. One might consider 
a reform of the VAT tax rate on national VAT 
receipts in order to single out the percentage to be 
transferred to the EU level. Citizens would finally 
know their direct contribution to the EU budget 
and become (at least this is the expectation) 
more attentive to what the EU does with their 
money. However, it seems implausible to tame the 
nation-based logic of the system of own resources 
without critically discussing the principle of fiscal 
sovereignty of the Member States. This principle 
constitutes the bulwark of the fiscal idea of the EU 
as an association of states, an association where 
representation without taxation is acceptable as 
long as national parliaments control national 
financial transfers to the EU. The HLGOR does 
not call that principle into question, but favours 
reform within the existing treaty constraints. 
Other proposals to reform the EU system of own 
resources have been advanced. The HLGOR duly 
recognizes that the EP, the Commission, and 
even the Court of Auditors have raised vociferous 
criticism of the current system. These institutions 
have criticized it as being too complex and non-
transparent, in particular with regard of the 
calculation of the VAT-based resources and the 
rebate on the UK contribution. Moreover, reliance 
on national contributions has fostered regular 
tensions between Member States. There have 
regularly been delayed payments to the EU from 
a few Member States, in particular in periods of 
economic difficulty. The same SGP has further 
increased the constraining pressure on the use of 
national budgetary resources. Finally, the system 
has been criticized because of the rules regulating 
the decision-making system adopted to manage 
the budgetary process. Unanimity of the 28 
Member States is required to introduce even the 
smallest change in the structure of the EU budget. 
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Although they have stressed these limits of the EU 
system of own resources, the Commission and the 
EP have refrained from asking for a revision of the 
treaties.
In the EP and Commission proposals there is no 
clarity regarding the logic that should inform the 
reform strategy. As Bordignon and Scabrosetti 
(2015: 9) argue, reform of the EU system of own 
resources depends “on the view about the nature of 
the EU: a true federation, with a sovereignty of its 
own which transcends that of the Member States; 
or just a club of sovereign states which join forces 
in providing some common goods (…) The answer 
is not obvious”. It has not been obvious because of 
the contradictory EU institutional features. This 
is epitomized by the existence of different unions 
within the EU, in particular the union of the 
single market and the union of the single currency 
(Fabbrini S. 2015a). These two unions are governed 
by different decision-making logics, although in 
both unions the popular legislature (the EP) is 
deprived of taxing powers and even of the power to 
propose new laws. It is true that the EP plays a co-
decisional role in managing the regulatory policies 
of the single market and only a consultative role 
in the policies connected to the single currency, 
where decisions are taken through the voluntary 
coordination of government leaders and ministers 
and mainly have a political character (Bickerton, 
Hodson and Puetter 2015). Nevertheless, in both 
policy and institutional regimes, the EP operates 
within the financial constraints defined by the 
Member State governments. The EU has thus set 
up an unprecedented system of representation 
without taxation. This is the exact reverse of the 
contradictory condition of the American colonies 
during British rule: they had to pay taxes, but 
they did not have institutions representing their 
citizens. If one assumes that the EU is and should 
remain an organization controlled by national 
governments, then this lack of taxation power 
of the EP is justifiable, as it is the Member State-
based system of own resources. This might be 
rationalized, even reformed, but not modified. A 
muddling-through strategy might be an effective 
and expedient way to introduce these changes.
However, if the contradictory features of the EU 
area were cleared up and the different unions 
developing within the EU were distinguished, 
then a different reform strategy might be devised. 
A preliminary step should consist in recognizing 
that the operation of the single market can be 
based on the principle of national fiscal sovereignty 
while this principle cannot be preserved to 
organise the operation of the Eurozone. For the 
latter, it would seem necessary to introduce a 
disconnection between the EU budget dependent 
on national transfers and EU policies by identifying 
independent financial resources usable by the 
Eurozone institutions (both intergovernmental 
and supranational). After several years of deep 
economic crisis, the EU would also need a Fund 
for Growth to support the Juncker Investment Plan 
and a Fund for Unemployment Insurance to be 
managed at the European level. It would probably 
also need to issue European Bonds for strategic 
investment, a possibility that was recognized in 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
set up in Paris in 1951. Bonds for investment 
should not be confused with the sharing of 
national public debts, which is prohibited by the 
current treaties. In any case, in the Eurozone, 
budgetary resources should be connected to the 
zone’s growing policy responsibilities, and not set 
in advance through negotiations that exclusively 
express national interests. The Eurozone should 
thus revise the principle of national fiscal 
sovereignty because it constrains its systemic need 
to counteract asymmetrical shocks. This revision 
would probably imply a change in the treaties, but 
this change should concern the Eurozone and not 
the EU as such. At the EU level, in fact, a treaty 
revision would trigger impassioned resistance 
from those Member States that interpret the EU 
as an economic community aiming to optimize 
transnational economic activities. It does not 
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seem plausible to solve the contrast of views and 
interests between Eurozone and non-Eurozone 
Member States through a new round of opt-outs 
as was done in the past (think of the opt-outs from 
the most integrative projects, such as the EMU, 
Schengen, and specific sub-sets of justice and 
home policies, granted to EU member states such 
as the UK, Denmark, Sweden, the Czech Republic 
and even to a Eurozone Member State such as 
Ireland).
This is why the reform proposals that have 
emerged in recent years mainly concern the 
EMU budgetary framework, also because the 
euro crisis has hit the Eurozone much more than 
non-Eurozone Member States. The crisis has 
dramatically called into question the compromise, 
settled in Maastricht and then formalized in 
Lisbon, between a centralized monetary policy, 
as requested by Germany, and a decentralized 
economic, fiscal and budgetary policy, as requested 
by France (Tuori and Tuori 2014). The crisis has 
shown the weakness of a policy regime organized 
around centralized control of the single currency 
and decentralized governance of the policies 
connected to that single currency. In particular, a 
need for the Eurozone to have its own budget to 
use for anti-cyclical purposes has clearly emerged 
from the crisis (Iara 2015). The very existence 
of a euro-budget would require an independent 
Eurozone fiscal capacity, i.e. fiscal resources 
that are independent of the willingness of the 
Member States to transfer them to the Eurozone 
level. As was asserted in the Report of the Four 
Presidents, submitted to the European Council in 
December 2012, it is necessary for the Eurozone 
to establish “a well-defined and limited fiscal 
capacity to improve the absorption of country-
specific economic shocks, through an insurance 
system set up at the central level” (Van Rompuy et 
al. 2012: 5). This fiscal capacity should necessarily 
be limited, as Van Rompuy’s report stressed, but 
not necessarily at the current low level. Indeed, it 
is worth recalling that the MacDougall Report of 
1977 already proposed increasing the EU budget to 
a level of 2-2.5 per cent of total GDP. What matters 
is that fiscal capacity should not be constrained to 
respect a pre-established level agreed in advance 
if it has to be adopted for anti-cyclical purposes 
(Bordo, Markiewicz and Jonung 2012). The 
need for a euro budget was further confirmed 
by the Five Presidents’ Report, submitted to the 
European Council in June 2015, as a condition for 
setting up a fiscal union integrating the monetary 
union (Juncker et al. 2015). A euro budget might 
be set up by means of various measures decided 
in a context of enhanced cooperation between 
the Eurozone Member States, such as a financial 
transaction tax, a carbon tax, EMU VAT, and taxes 
on activities made possible by the very existence of 
the EMU (Fabbrini F. 2014; Maduro 2012). 
Setting up a euro budget would inevitably imply a 
reform of the governance system of the Eurozone. 
Genuine own resources accruing to the Eurozone 
would require a democratization of the decision-
making process on the use of those resources. 
Although several models might be devised, from 
a democratic theory point of view all of them 
should imply a strengthening of the decision-
making power of the EP, transforming it into a 
congressional institution (according to the checks-
and-balances model of separation of powers) 
(Fabbrini S. 2015b). It is worth recalling that 
the current governance system of the Eurozone 
has marginalized the EP, instead favouring the 
monitoring role of national parliaments. This 
has meant that some national parliaments (those 
of the Member States with creditor status) have 
turned out to be much more relevant than other 
national parliaments (those with debtor status). 
For instance, the green light for the third aid 
package for Greece in August 2015 came from the 
German Bundesrat and not from the EP. Inter-
parliamentarism, like inter-governmentalism, 
favours the larger creditor member states, in 
particular in a crisis situation (Fabbrini S. 2013), 
institutionalizing a hierarchical relation between 
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states that conflicts with the principle of equality 
of states (which underlay the founding of the 
EU (Fabbrini F. 2013)). Direct financial transfers 
might likely generate divisions between Member 
States (Rant and Mrak 2010). Indeed this was 
dramatically shown by the Greek crisis in summer 
2015, when the possibility of a Grexit was raised 
by the main creditor Member state (Germany) 
jeopardizing the viability of the monetary union 
In sum, a reform of the budgetary system of the EU 
might be the occasion for distinguishing between 
the Member States supporting the fiscal idea of 
the EU as an association of states and the Member 
States, mainly belonging to the Eurozone, in need 
of creating an effective democratic union of states. 
As a union of states, the Eurozone would need to 
have its own genuine resources through which to 
manage its policy responsibilities, thus connecting 
taxation power with popular representation. A 
democratic union of states is incompatible with 
both representation without taxation and taxation 
without representation.
CONCLUSION
Discussion of reform of the EU own resources 
system has a political rather than a technical 
character. If the EU is considered to be an 
association of states, notwithstanding the 
supranational features acquired during its 
development, then the current system of financially 
supporting its activities through national transfers 
is understandable, and with it the principle of fiscal 
sovereignty of its Member States. On the contrary, 
if the EU is considered to be a union of states 
with federal features, then the current system 
should be reformed, moving in the direction of 
dual fiscal sovereignty: the sovereignty of each 
Member State and the sovereignty of the Union. 
However, the EU is a mixed regime, or rather it is 
based on a dual constitution (Fabbrini S. 2015a) 
encompassing different institutional logics and 
reflecting different systemic needs, in particular 
with regard to the single market on the one hand 
and the single currency on the other. If the EU is 
a framework within which several unions coexist, 
as argued in this article, then reform of the own 
resources system should follow a differentiated 
strategy. That is, it seems plausible to maintain 
the current system of indirect financial support 
for the activities connected to the policies of the 
single market (although rationalized), and at the 
same time to build a fiscal capacity (although 
limited) to support the activities connected to 
the governance of the single currency. To adopt a 
reform approach towards the EU as a whole would 
inevitably lead to a stalemate. Thus, if the principle 
of national fiscal sovereignty is preserved for the 
countries participating in the single market, in 
the Eurozone fiscal sovereignty should be shared 
between its Member States and the Eurozone 
institutions, although obviously the fiscal capacity 
of the Eurozone should necessarily be limited.
At the same time, setting up Eurozone taxes would 
trigger a rationalization, if not a down-sizing, of 
the national taxes of the Member States of the area 
(Weiss 2013). Finally, if the principle of national 
fiscal sovereignty is compatible with an EU system 
of representation without taxation, the principle 
of dual fiscal sovereignty implies the necessity 
of connecting taxation and representation at the 
Eurozone level. In sum, through a differentiated 
reform of the EU system of own resources it is 
possible to make a crucial step forward towards 
a more accountable and effective euro union 
without straining the operation of the inclusive 
single market.
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The workshop organised by the EUI on European 
Union Own Resources has a particular relevance 
in as far as the reforming process is concerned.
Although the Treaty of Lisbon has left the revenue 
side practically unchanged, the legislator has 
nevertheless included a new chapter (Chapter 1 
(Article 311): The Union’s Own Resources) in the 
brand new title II - Financial Provisions.
The particular relevance of today’s debates is 
not linked to the timing but to the process. The 
last negotiations on the 2014-2020 Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF) have highlighted 
the limits of the current system. The European 
Parliament conditioned its approval of the 2014-
2020 MFF with the setting up of a High Level Group 
on Own Resources composed of representatives 
of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission. The High Level Group is chaired by 
Mario Monti who accepted to introduce today’s 
workshop.
Over the past decade, the European Parliament 
has played a major role in pushing forward a 
reform of the financing of the EU Budget through 
the so-called own resources system.
WHY AND HOW?
1) Why did the EP influence the process?
The Budgetary Dimension 
Although the source of and decision on the 
financing of the EU Budget remains mainly an 
intergovernmental prerogative, the European 
Parliament is nevertheless granted powers by 
the Treaty. Article 314 of the TFEU places the 
Parliament and the Council on equal footing to 
adopt the annual budget of the European Union:
Article 314 TFEU: The European Parliament and 
the Council .... shall establish the Union’s annual 
budget ...”
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Furthermore, Articles 310 and 314 make it clear 
that revenue is part of the annual budget :
Article 310(1) TFEU : “All items of revenue and 
expenditure of the Union shall be included in 
estimates to be drawn up for each financial year and 
shall be shown in the budget”
Article 314(1) TFEU: The draft budget shall 
contain an estimate of revenue and an estimate of 
expenditure.”
Article 314(4)(c) TFEU: The EP may adopt AMs to 
the Council’s position on the draft budget (which 
includes an estimate of revenue).
Article 323 TFEU: “The European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission shall ensure that the 
financial means are made available to allow the 
Union to fulfil its legal obligations in respect of third 
parties.”
Article 2(c) of the Financial Regulation: “budget” 
means “the instrument which for each financial 
year, forecasts and authorises all revenue and 
expenditure considered necessary for the Union.”
It follows that the EP is, in principle, entitled 
to amend the revenue side when it reacts to the 
Council’s position on the draft budget.
It can be noted that when the EP grants discharge 
to the Commission in accordance with Article 319 
TFEU, it does so on the basis of an examination 
of both revenue and expenditure. Thus, EP’s 
budgetary powers (including the discharge 
procedure) cover both sides of the budget.
The Political Dimension
As an elected body, the European Parliament has 
responsibilities towards the European citizens in 
line with the principle of “no taxation without 
representation”.
The EP is one branch of the Budgetary Authority 
with full discharge authority. In this capacity, 
it decides the expenditure of the EU budget 
and gives discharge to the Commission on the 
implementation of the budget = revenues and 
expenditure. 
Although the principle of “no taxation without 
representation” should also be applicable to the 
EU budget, the European Parliament has so far 
been the branch of the Budgetary Authority that 
has used its powers mostly on the expenditure, 
and not on the revenue side.
Even though its discretion is in practice greatly 
restricted by the ORD, the EP is nevertheless 
perfectly entitled to scrutinise and debate the 
revenue side of the budget.
It might be of some symbolic value and a sign of 
democratic responsibility that the EP begins to do 
this, taking into account that the budget “forecasts 
and authorises all revenue and expenditure 
considered necessary for the Union” (Article 2(c) 
Financial Regulation).
Budgetary decisions, both at the multiannual level 
and the annual level, have become increasingly 
difficult, arduous and conflicting.
The 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 MFF negotiations 
have shown the limits of solidarity between 
Member States, where two opposing camps, 
composed of net payers on one side and net 
beneficiaries on the other, differ in their accounting 
visions of the EU Budget. They adjusted their 
agreements with a long list of derogation ‘gifts’ 
and negotiated compensations under the logic of 
‘juste retour’ until this ‘zero sum game’ reached 
agreement and the unanimity of the 28 Member 
States was achieved.
Annual budgetary decisions have also become 
increasingly strenuous (the 2011-2013-2015 
Budget negotiations failed to adopt a joint text 
within the 21 days for conciliation provided for by 
the Treaty). Constant sources of conflict between 
the EP and the Council have emerged over recent 
years, notably on the level of payments.
Year after year, the number of ‘unpaid bills’ based 
on payment claims (24.7bn at the end of 2014) 
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accumulating on the Commission’s desk has risen, 
putting at risk the possibility of the EU ability to 
fulfil its ambitions and commitments through its 
budget, and hence the credibility of the EU itself.
Such a situation is clearly in contradiction to 
Article 323 TFEU, which states:
The European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission shall ensure that the financial means 
are made available to allow the Union to fulfil its 
legal obligations in respect of third parties.
The budgetary constraints due to the economic 
crisis have exacerbated the pressure on national 
budgets, and since 80% of the OR financing the 
EU Budget comes from GNI resources, Member 
States have been more and more reluctant to 
provide sufficient levels of payments.
The link between the OR system, notably the GNI 
component (based on Member States wealth), 
and the level of expenditure, notably the level of 
payments into annual budgets, has been fervently 
stressed by the EP. What was a technical problem 
has now become a political issue (e.g. the GNI-
based calculation incident in 2014).
The overall effect of the ORD is that the annual 
budgetary negotiations are expenditure-led: the 
amount of payments on the expenditure side 
determines the amount which will have to be raised 
on the revenue side (principle of equilibrium). As 
a consequence, the Council insists on keeping 
payments as low as possible to minimise the call 
for GNI-based resources.
NB : Nevertheless, although the GNI/wealth resource 
is a problem for the EP it is less a problem for the 
Council because it guarantees budgetary discipline. 
It is a kind of insurance that EU spending remains 
under control. 
Maintaining an institutional balance will be one 
of the main challenges for the High Level Group.
The Institutional Dimension
In a brand new Title II dedicated to Financial 
Provisions, for the first time the TFEU in its article 
311 states:
“The Union shall provide itself with the means to 
attain its objectives and carry through its policies”
There is a new aspect in article 311(4) TFEU 
which deserves to be considered. The Treaty 
leaves decision on the ORD at intergovernmental 
level (unanimity plus ratification by national 
parliaments) but opens the implementation 
measures of the new ORD to the consent of the 
European Parliament.
This means that if a new system of OR is to be put in 
place from 2020 onwards, future ORD could take 
the form of a framework decision guaranteeing 
the principles of sustainability, sufficiency, 
transparency, equity etc., and leaving it to the 
Parliament to influence the kind of resources.
There is no doubt that the EP will use this new 
power granted by the Treaty as a leverage, which 
would significantly increase its legitimacy as part 
of the budgetary authority.
2) How did the EP influence the process?
The EP adopted, by a huge majority, the initiative 
report by Alain Lamassoure in 20071. The report 
raised awareness of the weaknesses in the current 
system and highlighted the distortion in the initial 
system of the Treaty of Rome based on genuine 
own resources.
The European Parliament has regularly continued 
to stress the institutional imbalance of the 
Parliament as full co-legislator, co-budgetary 
authority, and discharge authority, being directly 
elected (representing 500 million citizens and 
taxpayers) and having no say on how the EU 
Budget is financed. It used a major weapon by 
1 The future of the European Union’s own resources, 29 
March 2007
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conditioning its agreement (consent) to the 2014-
2020 MFF on a joint declaration on OR, thus 
clearly linking both revenues and expenditures.
The Parliament “Reaffirms its basic position, as 
stated in its resolution of 13 June 2012, that it is 
not prepared to give its consent to the next MFF 
regulation without political agreement on reform of 
the own resources system.”
As a consequence, the EP vigorously supported 
the creation of the HLGOR, announced on 
25 February 2014 in a joint declaration made 
in Strasbourg by the President of the EP, the 
President of the Council and the President of the 
Commission.
Mario Monti said on that day,
“I am confident that, building on this unprecedented 
joint initiative of the three institutions, our group 
will provide well-founded options for future 
decisions with a view to a simpler, more transparent, 
equitable and democratically accountable system”
The commitment and involvement of the European 
Parliament in this process has been continuous 
and accompanied by a strong will at all stages by 
all political groups at all levels of the decision-
making process: rapporteurs, coordinators, 
the Committee on Budgets, the Conference of 
Presidents, the President of the EP and the plenary 
session of the EP.
The long-standing efforts and interests of the 
Parliament are for this issue to remain within 
the intergovernmental sphere and to keep it on 
the political agenda. Will this newly composed 
Parliament continue in this direction?
In a context of legitimacy, further questions may 
be raised : 
· Will the national parliaments, who, 
according to the Treaty, have the prerogative 
to ratify a new ORD, be ready for a change 
in the system? 
· Can the legitimacy to raise taxes for the EU 
Budget be shared between the national and 
European levels? 
· Should the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality apply to this very sensitive 
issue in the future?
When Mario Monti presented the First Assessment 
Report to the Conference of Presidents in January 
2014, almost all the leaders of the political groups 
insisted on involving the national parliaments at 
an early stage. The inter-parliamentary conference 
with national parliaments, which will be hosted 
by the European Parliament in June 2016, will 
constitute a major step.
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The most prominent and debated issues in the 
negotiations on the EU MFF for the period 2014 
to 2020 were the overall budget volume, the 
structure of expenditures, and the continuation of 
the rebates for (some) net contributor countries. 
In contrast, the system of own resources of the 
EU was hardly addressed in the negotiations, 
although it is one of the most important obstacles 
to a future-oriented and sustainable reform of the 
EU budget.
The EU budget is currently essentially based on 
three revenue sources: traditional own resources 
(agricultural tariffs, sugar customs duties, general 
tariffs), VAT-based own resources and GNI-
based own resources. Since the end of the 1970s, 
traditional own resources received directly by 
the EU have greatly lost importance. Financing 
of the EU budget is increasingly dependent on 
direct contributions from Member States’ national 
budgets, and particularly on GNI-based resources.
The design of the financing system of the EU, 
which has evolved over more than 60 years since 
the founding of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1952, is characterised by 
a number of shortcomings rooted in the low and 
still decreasing revenue autonomy of the EU. As 
the own resources of the EU consist primarily of 
contributions by Member States paid directly from 
national budgets, the EU budget has increasingly 
become the subject of political conflict, as was 
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most clearly revealed by the “net contributor 
debate”. Reaching an agreement on the MFF is 
becoming more and more difficult, particularly 
with economic divergences widening in the last 
(and future) enlargement rounds. This carries 
the risk of the EU budget becoming chronically 
under-financed to meet the challenges facing the 
EU in the future. This risk is evidenced by both 
the 2007 to 2013 and the 2014 to 2020 MFFs, each 
setting expenditures to decline as a ratio of EU 
GNI, rather than being at least held constant as is 
warranted by the current and future tasks of the 
EU.
The predominance of national contributions 
narrows down the focus of member states on 
monetary net returns from the EU budget, i.e. 
the relation between national contributions 
to the budget and monetary returns from the 
individual policy areas (common agricultural 
policy, structural and cohesion policy, research 
and innovation, etc.). However, the benefits of 
EU membership beyond pure financial flows 
related to the EU budget do not play much of a 
role as criteria in Member States’ evaluations 
and decisions. Within the EU, with its increasing 
divergences and therefore national interests, such 
a perspective focusing on individual country-
specific monetary costs and benefits inevitably 
aggravates the controversy over the EU budget 
and increasingly hinders compromises. It is an 
essential reason why particularly net-contributor 
countries, whose gross contributions exceed 
the transfers received from the EU budget, 
urge limitation of the volume of the EU budget. 
Moreover, it furthers the tendency of Member 
States to support the preservation of expenditure 
categories promising to maximise their individual 
country-specific transfers received from the EU 
budget, instead of pushing for an expenditure 
structure from which maximal benefit for the 
EU as a whole (“European value added”) may be 
expected. In this context, it should be recalled that 
the financial resources at the disposal of the EU also 
serve to finance various “European public goods”, 
i.e. goods or activities with positive cross-border 
external effects and with European value added. In 
particular, this concerns expenditures in the areas 
of research and innovation, education, transport 
infrastructure and climate/energy policy, decided 
upon at the EU level. Securing fiscal equivalence 
would also require assigning to the EU the taxes 
necessary to finance these expenditures.
Moreover, the lack of tax autonomy at the EU level 
runs counter to the long-term trend of deeper 
integration. Despite an increase in negative cross-
border externalities (e.g. environmental damage) 
caused by the ever-closer economic integration 
of member states, EU policy refrains from using 
taxes at the European level to influence economic 
agents’ behaviour, thus foregoing the potential 
benefits of a potentially powerful market-based 
policy instrument. In general, the current revenue 
system hardly contributes to or supports EU 
policies.
In addition, the system of own resources 
is characterised by considerable degrees of 
complexity and lack of transparency. While 
the three revenue sources as such are easy to 
understand, their implementation is not. This is 
mainly caused by the UK rebate and the various 
mechanisms for its correction. In addition, the 
concrete design of the VAT-based own resource, 
particularly the determination of the tax base, is 
often criticised as somewhat complicated.
Moreover, the structural adjustments made since 
the early days of the European Community are 
the result of political compromises (such as the 
correction mechanism for the financing of the UK 
rebate). Apart from the resulting administrative 
burden, this trend also undermines political 
credibility and the legitimacy of national financial 
contributions, since the populations of the 
individual Member States are less and less able to 
identify their own contributions to the financing 
of the EU budget and the relationship between 
revenue and expenditure. 
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Not least, within the group of net contributing 
countries, which in the period from 2007 to 
2011 included 11 member states, a “rebate from 
the rebate” for the UK was only granted to the 
four countries which are traditionally the most 
important net contributors, despite the fact that 
they do not necessarily – in relative terms – carry 
the largest net contribution burdens. Therefore, 
complete elimination of the correction mechanism 
for the UK rebate is an important element of a 
more simple, transparent and equitable system of 
financing the EU budget, and more so as the initial 
reason to grant a rebate to the UK in the first place 
– relatively low economic prosperity and high net 
contributions – has disappeared during the last 30 
years.
From an equity perspective, it may also be 
considered problematic that the poorer 
member states, which on the one hand benefit 
from cohesion policy, on the other hand over-
proportionately contribute to financing the 
various correction mechanisms to alleviate the net 
contribution burden of the richer countries. It may 
also be criticised that capping individual VAT-
based resource payments by limiting the part of 
the harmonised VAT base on which the call rate is 
applied to 50 percent of GNI does not necessarily 
alleviate the burden for the poorer countries, as 
there is no clear relationship between a country’s 
GNI and the size of the VAT base.
1. OPTIONS FOR A FUNDAMENTAL 
REFORM OF THE SYSTEM OF OWN 
RESOURCES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
In the longer-term perspective, budgetary leeway is 
to be created for the financing of tasks ranking high 
in the Europe 2020 strategy through further shifts 
in the expenditure structure, notably the already-
initiated restraint on agricultural spending. Given 
the conflicting interests of the Member States, it 
is nevertheless doubtful whether such shifts will 
progress at sufficient speed to create the necessary 
budgetary room for manoeuvre. All the more so, 
since agricultural spending will (have to) remain 
a major responsibility for the EU, albeit with 
substantial adjustments towards organic farming, 
the preservation and development of rural areas and 
the promotion of tourism, reflecting the changing 
role of agriculture. Against this background, 
conferring a certain degree of tax autonomy on 
the EU by substituting own EU tax revenues for 
part of national financial contributions appears to 
be an option worth exploring.
In principle, two alternative reform strategies to 
address the existing shortcomings of the system of 
own resources may be envisaged:
· Reforms within the existing system of own 
resources with the aim of streamlining it. In 
practice, this would lead to the elimination 
of the VAT-based own resource so that, 
given the ongoing loss in importance of 
traditional own resources, the budget 
would in the long run be financed almost 
entirely by GNI-based own resources;
· The introduction of EU taxes, as (partial) 
compensation for loss of the existing 
revenue sources. This option would assign 
some degree of tax autonomy to the EU.
 The criticism advanced against the current 
system of own resources advises in favour 
of the latter reform strategy, conferring on 
the EU some degree of tax autonomy in 
combination with a reform of key features 
of the existing system of own resources 
along the following lines:
· Elimination of VAT-based own resources;
· Attribution of own taxes to the EU to 
compensate for the abolition of VAT-based 
own resources and in recognition of the 
arguments in favour of EU tax autonomy;
· Reinforcement of own EU tax revenues 
through GNI-based own resources;
· Reform of the correction mechanism to 
finance the UK rebate.
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Starting from these key elements, the following 
considerations are devoted to a crucial issue in 
the debate on alternative revenue sources for the 
EU budget, i.e. the question of what kind of taxes 
would lend themselves to the establishment of an 
own EU tax sovereignty (or as supplementary or 
alternative revenue sources).
One basic assumption is that financing the EU 
budget entirely or at least primarily through own 
taxes is for the time being neither meaningful nor 
possible under the existing framework conditions. 
One argument against that is the existing ban 
on incurring debt, which requires an additional 
revenue source to balance the budget in the case 
that actual tax revenues fall short of projections. 
In addition, financing all EU responsibilities 
entirely through own taxes would require much 
deeper integration of the EU member states than 
is presently the case, leading more towards a 
federal state.
Weighing up EU taxes on the one hand against 
GNI-based own resources on the other hand 
is an issue beyond pure economic reasoning. 
It is instead a political decision for Member 
States to decide the extent to which they see the 
Community eventually moving towards a federal 
state that needs its own legal framework for 
fiscal relations and an own tax sovereignty. This 
is also a crucial factor in the degree and factual 
implementation of the tax autonomy conferred on 
the EU. It may either be confined to the power to 
decide on how to allocate its own resources, or it 
may extend to legislative powers in tax matters. 
In the first case, the EU would receive a certain 
fraction of national tax revenues or be granted the 
right to levy a supplementary rate on a given tax 
base, with the right of decision on tax bases and 
national tax rates essentially remaining with the 
Member States. In the second case, the EU would 
acquire the right to determine the tax base and 
rate, with Member States possibly having the right 
to levy a supplement.
In its reports on the operation of the EU own 
resources system, the European Commission 
establishes seven criteria for the evaluation of own 
resources:
· visibility and simplicity
· financial autonomy
· a contribution towards an efficient 
allocation of economic resources
· yield
· cost efficiency with regard to tax 
administration
· revenue stability
· an equitable gross burden.
These criteria may be applied only partially or in 
modified form in the following assessment of the 
suitability of different taxes as financial sources 
for the EU budget. They will be supplemented by 
further criteria developed using the theory of fiscal 
federalism as a yardstick for assigning different 
taxes to the different levels of government. Thus, 
for the assessment of whether a certain tax may 
qualify as an EU tax, the following criteria may be 
formulated:
· The degree of regional attribution: the 
lower the possibility of determining the 
share of individual member states in the tax 
base/tax revenues, or the lower the identity 
between the country where tax revenues 
accrue and the country of residence of tax 
subjects, the greater the suitability as an EU 
tax.
· Cross-border negative externalities: the 
higher they are, the higher the qualification 
as an EU tax, since the optimal tax rate 
from the national perspective is below that 
from the European perspective.
· Mobility of the tax base: the higher it is, 
the higher in principle the qualification as 
an EU tax, since centralisation may help 
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to prevent a possibly harmful “race to the 
bottom”.
· Short-term volatility: the higher it is, the 
lower the qualification as an EU tax. Due 
to the ban on EU debt, the flow of own 
resources should be stable in the short term 
and as cyclically-insensitive as possible.
· Long-term yield (revenue elasticity): the 
higher it is, the higher the qualification as 
an EU tax, since, with European integration 
and given the long-term challenges the EU 
is facing, the range of tasks and therefore 
the financial needs will probably rise.
· Visibility: the more visible and perceptible 
a tax is for the tax subjects, the higher its 
qualification as an EU tax, since the link 
between tax payment and a return from the 
EU budget is made transparent.
· Equity of the gross burden at the national 
level: the closer the link between the tax base 
(and therefore the tax burden) and national 
income, the higher the qualification as an 
EU tax.
 Table 1 gives an overview of the candidates for 
new own resources mentioned in the European 
Commission’s various reports on the functioning 
of the system of own resources and options for its 
reform.
Table 1: Candidates for new own resources according to the European Commission
European Commission (1998) European Commission (2004) European Commission (2010)
CO2 or energy tax
modified value added tax
excises on tobacco, alcohol and 
mineral oil
EU corporate income tax
tax on transport and 
telecommunication services
income tax; interest on income tax
tax on ECB gains from seigniorage
EU energy tax
EU value added tax
EU corporate income tax
taxes on the financial sector 
(financial transaction tax and 
financial activity tax)
revenues from auctioning under 
the greenhouse gas Emissions 
Trading System
charges related to air transport
EU VAT
EU energy tax
EU corporate income tax
Source: own compilation.
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Table 2: Potential EU taxes
Tax base (tax) Key features Potential revenues 
per year
% of EU 
expenditure 
per year1
Financial transactions 
(Financial Transaction Tax 
– FTT)
0.1% tax rate on bond and share transactions, 0.01% 
tax rate on derivatives transactions
0.1% tax rate on bond, share and foreign currency 
transactions, 0.01% tax rate on derivatives transac-
tions 
€20 billion (by 
2020) 
 
€50 billion (by 
2020)
15 
 
36
Sum of profit and remuner-
ation of financial institu-
tions  
(Financial Activities Tax – 
FAT)
5% tax rate on the sum of profit and remuneration 
of financial institutions according to the addition-
method FAT applied at source 
no fully harmonized tax centrally collected at EU 
level, but revenue-sharing between member states 
and EU
€24.6 billion (2009) 18
Charge related to air trans-
port 
(Departure Tax or Flight 
Duty Tax)
tax on passengers flying from an EU airport, dif-
ferentiated according to distance and class of travel 
(Departure Tax) 
tax on flights (Flight Duty Tax) 
decentralized or centralized collection possible
€20 billion (by 
2020)
15
Consumption  
(EU Value Added Tax – 
VAT)
1% tax rate on goods and services subject to stan-
dard tax rate 
decentralized collection and transfer to EU
€20.9 billion to 
€50.4 billion (2009)
15
Energy consumption 
CO2 emissions 
(EU Energy Levy, EU CO2 
Levy)
Single EU tax rate on quantities of energy products 
released for consumption based on their energy 
content 
Minimum rate of CO2-related taxation defined in 
revised ETD
Decentralized or centralized collection possible
No estimates avail-
able
-
Profits of incorporated 
firms (EU Corporate In-
come Tax – CIT)
Less than 2% tax rate on national corporate income 
tax base 
decentralized collection and transfer to EU
€15 billion 11
Sources: European Commission (2010, 2011A, 2011B); own compilation.
1Expenditure per year calculated as average of total expenditure for the period 2014 to 2020.
Evaluation of these taxes according to the 
criteria specified above (Table 3) gives only 
rough indications, since it does not allow for a 
possible fine-tuning of the different criteria but 
only distinguishes between “somewhat useful” 
or “somewhat less useful” as an EU tax. For 
further considerations on the actual design of 
an own resources system which is also based on 
Table 2 contains the key features and potential 
revenues from the candidates included in the 
European Commission’s latest documents on 
the operation of the system of own resources 
and options for its reform. Altogether, the 
potential revenues from the various candidates 
may contribute to financing the EU budget to a 
considerable extent.
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EU taxes as genuine own resources, the analysis 
needs, of course, to be refined. It would also have 
to consider administrative costs and the question 
of the level (national or EU) at which revenues 
would be collected. None of the taxes briefly 
discussed below is deemed an “optimal” EU tax, 
since all of them miss one or more of the criteria 
defined above. Which of the taxes will actually be 
selected using these criteria, and the weight to be 
attributed to each of them, is in the end a political 
decision.
According to the above criteria, charges on air 
transport would qualify best as EU taxes. They may 
internalise negative cross-border externalities (in 
this case climate-damaging emissions) and thereby 
reduce air traffic. Assigning these taxes to the EU 
would rein in the possibility of tax avoidance 
caused by tax rate differentials between Member 
States. Their visibility for citizens and their short- 
and long-term revenue stability and tax yield are 
further arguments in favour of assigning them to 
the EU level. In particular, the tax avoidance to be 
expected speaks in favour of earmarking charges 
related to air transport entirely for the EU: a 
uniform tax rate should be fixed at the level of the 
EU and all revenues should be channelled into the 
EU budget.
The main arguments in favour of an FTT 
being assigned to the EU as an own tax are the 
impossibility of a regional attribution for such a 
tax and a prospective long-term yield. Moreover, 
unilateral implementation would be next to 
impossible, and considering the far-reaching 
integration of the European financial market, an 
FTT may also internalize negative cross-border 
externalities. In contrast to an EU CIT or VAT, 
differing national tax bases would not be an issue.
Regarding a partially centralised CIT, it may be 
argued in favour that the growing disconnections 
between value added and corporate location 
on the one hand and profit and its taxation on 
the other undermine the possibility of regional 
attribution of the tax. Moreover, it can be expected 
that corporate tax competition in the EU will 
intensify further due to the high mobility of the 
tax base. CIT is also characterised by a high yield 
in the longer term.
Table 3: Evaluation of options for EU taxes
Regional at-
tribution
negative 
cross-border 
externalities
mobiity of 
tax base
short-term 
volatility
long-term 
yield (rev-
enue elastic-
ity)
visibility equity of gross 
burden at 
national level
Financial 
Transaction 
Tax
+ + + - + - -
Financial 
Activities 
Tax
+ + + - + - -
Departure/
Flight Duty 
Tax
- + + + + + -
Value 
Added Tax
- - - - + + ?
Energy 
Levy/CO2 
Levy
- + - + + + ?
Corporate 
Income Tax
+ - + - + - -
Source: own. + somewhat in favour of being used as an EU tax; - somewhat against being used as an EU tax.
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Taxes on energy consumption have the advantage 
of low short-term volatility and a high long-term 
elasticity. Moreover, they can internalize cross-
border externalities and are highly visible to 
citizens.
VAT appears the least suitable candidate. Only its 
long-term revenue elasticity and high visibility for 
citizens speak in its favour.
Altogether the most straightforward option for an 
own EU tax is the FTT, which as a new tax has 
the additional advantage that national revenues 
would not be affected, which would be the case for 
charges on air transport and energy taxes, which 
exist in at least some Member States already. Thus, 
it can be expected that choosing the FTT as an 
EU tax will meet with less political resistance than 
options which imply redirecting national revenues 
to the EU budget.
From an administrative point of view, the FTT 
has the further advantage of there being no 
nationally differing tax bases that would need 
to be harmonised beforehand. It could cover a 
substantial share of total EU expenditure. If the 
aim is to extend the contribution of EU taxes even 
further, charges related to air transport would be 
another readily available solution, also considering 
that few Member States levy such charges at all, 
and that they are exposed to permanent criticism 
as they are regarded as a severe competitive 
disadvantage when implemented unilaterally 
at the national level. The same holds for a CO2 
tax, which some Member States have recently 
introduced.
When designing a new financial framework for 
the EU giving it a certain degree of tax autonomy 
and considering institutional aspects and political 
decision-making processes, a number of caveats 
need to be considered that are often emphasised 
by the opponents of EU taxes. A major concern is 
that an EU own tax responsibility would lead to 
permanent upward pressure on expenditure, all the 
more so as the EU budget is dominated by the goal 
of redistribution. Moreover, the assignment of (a 
certain degree of) tax autonomy to the EU would 
require a reinforcing of democratic legitimacy, 
i.e. strengthening the powers of the European 
Parliament further and tightening expenditure 
control and the fight against fraud. It can also be 
expected that the process of unwinding the UK 
rebate system will cause considerable political 
controversy. Therefore, any major reform is likely 
to require a considerable lead time. In this context, 
the problematic role of the unanimity rule as a 
major barrier against far-reaching reforms needs 
to be emphasised. It is one of the main reasons 
why Member States prefer to agree on a minimum 
consensus and for their principally critical attitude 
towards ambitious reform proposals.
EU OWN RESOURCES: MOMENTUM FOR A REFORM ?41
THE CASE FOR 
A SINGLE AND 
BUOYANT FISCAL 
SOURCE TO FUND 
THE EU BUDGET 
GABRIELE CIPRIANI1
Gabriele Cipriani holds a PhD in Political Sciences 
(University of Bologna - Italy) and a Master degree 
in European law (College of Europe – Bruges, 
Belgium). He joined in 1978 the European Court 
of Auditors where he has spent his whole career 
holding several managerial positions, lastly as 
Director of the Audit Chamber responsible for 
‘Structural Policies, Transport & Energy’. He is 
currently Principal Adviser.
Gabriele is the author of conference papers and 
publications on various aspects of EU finances. His 
core research interests focus on the reform of the 
EU budget and its accountability arrangements 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gabriele_
Cipriani/publications.
1 The opinions expressed by the author in this publication 
in no way commit his employer, the European Court of 
Auditors.
ABSTRACT
The visibility of taxpayers’ contributions to funding 
the EU budget will be the most critical element 
of any reform of EU revenue. The legitimacy of 
these contributions will depend even more on 
convincing Europeans that EU funds are making 
a difference across Europe. Renewal of both EU 
revenue and expenditure arrangements could start 
a virtuous process that may ultimately benefit the 
European integration project.
1. THE RATIONALE FOR A REFORM OF 
THE EU REVENUE SYSTEM
The agreement on the Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) 2014-2020 provided for a 
review of the EU revenue system by a High Level 
Group (HLGOR)2. Admittedly, the aim was not 
to increase the current resources, or to challenge 
the exclusive fiscal sovereignty of member states, 
making the Union financially independent of 
national parliaments by giving it the power to tax 
EU citizens directly3. Ultimately, the EU budget 
was to remain bound to a ‘drawing right’ on a given 
amount of fiscal resources collected by member 
states 4.
As for the four main objectives that should guide 
the review (simplicity, transparency, equity 
2 The HLGOR, chaired by Prof. Mario Monti, is composed 
of representatives of the Council, European Parliament 
and Commission.
3 See as background reference, European Parliament, 
Resolution of 29 March 2007 on the future of the Euro-
pean Union’s own resources, paras. 28-29; Resolution of 
8 June 2011 on Investing in the future: a new Multian-
nual Financial Framework (MFF) for a competitive, sus-
tainable and inclusive Europe, paras. 167-168; European 
Commission, A Budget for Europe 2020, COM (2011) 
500, 29 June 2011, part I, p. 7.
4 Payment appropriations are currently capped at 0.98% 
of EU Gross National Income. For a discussion on the 
concept of EU ‘own resources’, see Cipriani, Financing 
the EU Budget: Moving forward or backwards?, CEPS 
Paperback, Brussels, November 2014, pp. 6-10, http://
www.ceps.eu/system/files/Financing%20the%20EU%20
budget_Final_Colour.pdf.
EU OWN RESOURCES: MOMENTUM FOR A REFORM ?42
and democratic accountability), the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission (but 
also national parliaments) may have different and 
potentially divergent views on how best to tackle 
these issues5. 
Recourse to traditional criteria (such as equity; 
an adequate, stable and harmonised assessment 
basis; efficiency and cost-effectiveness of revenue 
collection; and visibility to taxpayers)6 will not be 
sufficient to smooth out all the differences. Any 
assessment of the suitability of a revenue source 
would depend on the actual definition of each 
criterion and its weighting7. 
Most importantly, setting a rationale for reform 
of EU revenue requires clarifying the liability for 
funding the EU budget. Should this remain an issue 
among national governments, or is it necessary 
5 For example, it is certainly no accident that in the ‘own 
resources’ decision applicable to the MFF 2014-2020 
(Council Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom of 26 May 
2014) the Council omitted to indicate, as proposed by the 
Commission, that the own resources system “should, as 
far as possible rely on autonomous own resources in the 
spirit of the Treaty, rather than on financial contribu-
tions from Member States which they widely perceive 
as national expenditures” (see European Commission, 
Amended proposal for a Council Decision on the system of 
own resources of the European Union, Recital No 4, COM 
(2011) 739, 9 November 2011). In addition, the Council 
position concerning ‘democratic accountability’ seems 
unclear. This objective was not included in its conclu-
sions of 7-8 February 2013 (see European Council Con-
clusions, doc. EUCO 37/13, 8 February 2013, point 111). 
The same omission can be observed in Recital No 3 of 
the own resources decision.
6 See, in particular: European Commission, Financing the 
European Union, COM (98) 560 final, 7 October 1998; 
Financing the European Union, COM (2004) 505 final, 
14 July 2004 and Financing the EU budget: Report on the 
operation of the own resources system, SEC (2011) 876, 
27 October 2011. See also European Convention, Final 
report of the discussion circle on own resources, CONV 
730/03, Cercle III 7, 8 May 2003, pp. 2-3, and European 
Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2007, op. cit., para 
41.
7 For example, as noted in the first assessment report of 
the HLGOR (17.12.2014, p. 27), the principle of equity 
can be translated into different courses of action, leading 
to different opinions, arguments and value judgments.
to acknowledge the status of the EU as a union 
of member states and their nationals by raising 
awareness of taxpayers’ individual contributions?8
These questions point to two possible basic options 
with quite different implications, concerning, in 
particular, an assessment of the ‘equity’ criterion 
and the potential impact on public opinion of 
putting the legitimacy of EU revenues at the 
forefront of public discussion.
One option would be continuation of the system 
of ‘national contributions’ funded from the coffers 
of national taxation and with no visibility for 
taxpayers. Compared to the current system, an 
extreme simplification could be made by setting a 
‘scale’ applicable to the financial contributions of 
member states (as in the Treaties of Rome)9. As 
is the case today, such a scale would result from a 
political agreement with the aim of incorporating 
any perceived budgetary ‘imbalance’ and in 
principle leaving unchanged the current burden-
sharing among member states10. The criterion of 
‘equity’ would thus be replaced by the concept 
of ‘reasonable net contribution’ based on the 
zero-sum logic of ‘budgetary balances’, where 
an accounting advantage of one member state 
is considered in practice to come at the expense 
of other member states 11. Fulfilment of the 
8 See Articles 1 TEU, 10 TEU, 13(1) TEU, 15 TFEU and the 
Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.
9 See Articles 200 EEC and 172 Euratom.
10 For an illustration of how such scales might look, see 
Cipriani 2014, op. cit., (Table 5, column 3, and Table 6, 
column 3). One could even envisage setting scales of this 
sort by spending area, as in the Treaties of Rome and 
following the same logic as the calculation of the finan-
cial participation of non-EU countries in some EU pro-
grammes, such as Research & Development.
11 The budgetary balance is a cash concept defined as the 
difference between a member state’s share in financing 
the EU budget and its share in allocated operational 
expenditure. The sum of all member state balances adds 
up to zero (for further details, see European Commis-
sion, EU Budget 2013 Financial Report, Luxembourg, 
2014, p. 125). In reality, due to the externalities generated 
by EU expenditure, its economic benefits are 
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transparency and democratic accountability 
requirements would be limited to national 
budgetary and discharge procedures, for example 
through a specific ‘Financing the EU budget’ entry 
in national budgets. 
A second option would be to acknowledge the 
central role of taxpayers in the Union and, in line 
with the principle of ‘proximity’ advocated by 
the Laeken declaration on the future of the EU 
(December 2001), to make their contribution to 
the EU budget visible through identifiable fiscal 
resources (transparency). Awakening the public 
from a state of ‘fiscal anaesthesia’ would put the 
size and evolution of individual contributions 
under its control and potentially trigger closer 
scrutiny of those managing EU funds (democratic 
accountability).
Equity would have to be assessed using different 
parameters, at taxpayer rather than at member 
state level12. Finally, ‘simplification’ would mainly 
depend on the nature and number of resources, as 
will be discussed below.
1.1. Old or new taxes?
Over the years, numerous proposals for new taxes 
to finance the EU budget have been put forward13. 
 spread over all the member states and even outside the 
EU (see Cipriani and Pisani, The European budget: An 
alternative to budgetary balances to assess benefits for the 
member states, Working Paper No. 339, Società italiana 
di economia pubblica, Pavia, October 2004, www.siep-
web.it/siep/it/pubblicazioni/working-papers/archivio-
anno-2004?start=40; Cipriani, Rethinking the EU Budget: 
Three Unavoidable Reforms, CEPS Paperback, Brussels, 
November 2007, pp. 90-97, http://www.ceps.eu/system/
files/book/1563.pdf).
12 For example, as noted in the first assessment report of 
the HLGOR (op. cit., p. 28), it has been argued that, 
overall, the present system of ‘national contributions’ 
is ‘regressive’ in the sense that member states with a 
lower per capita GNI do not contribute a lower share if 
‘national contributions’ are expressed as a percentage of 
GNI. This is mainly the result of corrections for some 
member states. An analysis of actual per capita contri-
butions in the 2007-2013 MFF is provided in Cipriani 
(2014), op. cit., in particular in Figure 4 and Table 7.
13 For example, an aviation sector tax; a resource based  
The Commission tabled one such proposal 
(Financial transaction tax or FTT) in 201114. The 
fact that such a tax is still not operational in the 
member states ready to go ahead with it (initially 
eleven, now ten), shows the difficulty of being 
‘innovative’ in terms of taxation15.
Since the EU has no power to raise taxes16, the 
introduction of new taxation to finance the 
EU budget would require convincing national 
governments to ‘promote’ such taxes vis-à-
vis their citizens. This would be a somewhat 
unpopular undertaking, as it would lead to an 
increase in overall taxation17, or at any rate it 
would be perceived in that way18. However, 
on emission auctioning in the context of the EU Emis-
sion Trading System (ETS); a tax on energy based on 
the revised Energy Taxation Directive; EU Corporate 
Income Tax (EUCIT); excise duty on motor fuel for 
transport and other energy taxes; excise duty on tobacco 
and alcohol; a tax on corporate profits; a tax on dealings 
in securities; a tax on transport or telecommunication 
services; withholding tax on interest; ECB profits (sei-
gniorage); Ecotax; taxes on currency transactions; a tax 
on savings; and taxes on financial transactions.
14 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Direc-
tive on a common system of financial transaction tax and 
amending Directive 2008/7/EC, COM (2011) 594, 28 Sep-
tember 2011.
15 For an analysis of the context for introducing a FTT, see 
Cipriani (2014), op. cit., pp. 39-44. The main aspects of 
the tax (such as collection, transactions liable for the 
tax, tax rates, tax basis and geographical scope) are still 
under discussion. These aspects would determine the 
volume of revenue and its allocation to the budgets of the 
participating countries. A decision on the open issues 
should be made by end of June 2016.
16  Except on the salaries of the members of the institutions 
and its own staff.
17  As in the case of the FTT (see note 14).
18  It would be extremely difficult to demonstrate that such 
new taxation would be offset by corresponding fiscal 
reductions elsewhere. As an example, to meet the condi-
tions for joining the euro, the Italian government intro-
duced a ‘contributo straordinario per l’Europa’ for 
 the year 1997. This was a kind of forced loan, meant to 
be reimbursed later on. While only 60 % of the amount 
was finally reimbursed, the widespread conviction is 
that such reimbursement was amply compensated for by 
further taxation.
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since the current volume of EU resources should 
remain unchanged, the proceeds from such taxes 
would only ultimately benefit national budgets. 
Governments may therefore be tempted to 
increase their own revenue and lay the blame on 
the EU.
Finally, as noted by the HLGOR19, the assessment 
of the potential amount of revenue which can be 
expected from new resources is a critical issue. To 
a greater or lesser extent, the assessment basis for 
such taxes may be narrow and uncertain. Here 
again, the case of the FTT provides useful lessons20. 
Moreover, new fiscal resources would necessarily 
increase administrative costs, notably because of 
new collection and control systems.
This shows that the introduction of new taxes with 
the explicit purpose of financing the EU budget 
raises serious difficulties, which in turn call into 
question the feasibility of introducing them in the 
foreseeable future. Given the difficult and complex 
procedure that would be necessary to amend the 
EU revenue system, and the time needed to put a 
new tax in place, reliance on existing fiscal sources 
would have the advantages that their broader 
implications are known, that they are already in 
place and that they could be adopted for the next 
MFF21. Old hens make the best soup.
1.2. One or more taxes?
Many of the new taxes proposed to fund the EU 
budget have the characteristics of earmarked taxes, 
linked to specific fiscal policy objectives in fields 
with an EU-wide relevance (e.g. energy, transport, 
environment, and telecommunications). Indeed, 
in such cases a regulation at EU level may 
19 See the first assessment report of the HLGOR (op. cit., p. 
30).
20 The potential revenue expected from a FTT is subject to 
uncertainties due to the risk of delocalisation of finan-
cial services. See also note 15.
21 In the same vein, the first ‘own resources’ decision 
(Council Decision 70/243/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 
21 April 1970) provided that the EU budget should be 
funded through existing taxes (custom duties and levies, 
VAT).
represent the most appropriate means of taxation 
with a transnational dimension, for example to 
reach greater harmonisation in the field of indirect 
taxation “to the extent that such harmonisation 
is necessary to ensure the establishment and the 
functioning of the internal market and to avoid 
distortion of competition” (Article 113 TFEU).22 
However, as the case of the FTT seems to confirm23, 
the allocation of the proceeds from such taxes to 
the EU budget is a different kettle of fish. As a result 
of the member states’ exclusive fiscal sovereignty, 
the choice of EU resources is a Council prerogative 
(Article 311 TFEU). Although appealing, the idea 
that the EU could lay claim to the proceeds from 
new and ‘unexploited’ fiscal sources is not in line 
with the Treaties.
The principle of a tax mix is understandable in a 
national context, as an instrument of fiscal policy. 
While the EU does not have such powers, it is also 
doubtful whether the limited size of the EU budget 
justifies the complication of introducing several 
fiscal sources, even with the understandable aim of 
ensuring a broader coverage of economic criteria 
on the whole24. Moreover, a plurality of ‘European’ 
taxes would portray the EU as ‘thirsty for power’, 
while at the same time making it more difficult for 
taxpayers to identify their overall contribution.
One single and already-existing tax therefore 
seems a more practical option for reforming the 
EU revenue system.
2. AN EU VAT-BASED RESOURCE
Value Added Tax (VAT) seems an obvious choice 
as a source of EU revenue for a number of reasons. 
VAT is a general consumption tax, in line with the 
idea of an EU budget for Europeans. It is largely 
harmonised, part of the acquis communautaire, 
22 For example, one of the reasons for introducing an EU 
FTT would be to avoid an uncoordinated patchwork of 
national financial transaction taxes.
23 See note 15.
24 As commented earlier, the actual definition of each crite-
rion is in any case subject to interpretation.
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and a pillar of the EU single market. VAT has 
a broad and relatively price-inelastic basis. It 
represents a main source of the EU countries’ 
revenue, with a marked growing trend since 
2008 and above the OECD average25. This shows 
the prominent role of VAT in EU fiscal systems. 
Moreover, there is no confirmed basis in fact for 
its alleged ‘regressivity’26. 
The idea of taking advantage of VAT as a fiscal source 
to fund the EU budget was already introduced in 
197027. Although this resource was rapidly de facto 
turned into a national contribution,28 the case 
for a VAT resource directly linked to taxpayers 
has been regularly reiterated29. Drawing on the 
Commission’s proposal tabled in 2004, a VAT-
based resource could operate in ‘symbiosis’ with 
the national VAT systems, on the basis of taxable 
25 The 21 OECD countries that are members of the EU have 
an average standard VAT rate of 21.7%, which is signifi-
cantly above the OECD average (19.1%). OECD (2014), 
Consumption Tax Trends 2014, OECD Publishing. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/ctt-2014-en.
26 A factual analysis undertaken by the Commission in 
2011 challenges the traditional view that VAT revenue is 
inequitable and regressive (see European Commission, 
Financing the EU budget: Report on the operation of the 
own resources system, SEC (2011) 876, op. cit., pp. 15 and 
27). Moreover, while GNI is often presented as the para-
digm of ‘equity’ (see European Commission, Financing 
the European Union, COM (1998) 560, op. cit., p. 11), in 
reality the current system is not exempt from ‘regres-
sivity’ effects (see note 12). It may be added that while 
direct imposition is in principle ‘progressive’, in practice 
it weighs to a large extent on those with a fixed income, 
which is easily verifiable by the fiscal authorities.
27 See note 21.
28 For a discussion about the ups and downs of the VAT 
resource, see Cipriani 2007, op. cit., pp. 46-55.
29 See, for example, European Parliament, Resolution of 
9 April 1981 on the Community’s own resources, para 
13; Draft Treaty establishing the European Union (Spi-
nelli Treaty), adopted on 14 February 1984; Resolution 
of 21 April 1994 on a new system of own resources for 
the European Union, para 9-10; European Commission, 
Financing the European Union, Vol. I, COM (2004) 505 
final, p. 11 and Vol. II, p. 53, 14 July 2004; The EU Budget 
review, Technical annexes, SEC (2010) 7000, 19 October 
2010, p. 34. 
persons’ returns. Such a resource, which would 
ultimately represent a levy on households’ final 
consumption, could take the form of an EU VAT 
rate as part of the national rate, so as to leave the 
fiscal burden on the final consumer unchanged. 
As the VAT base is large, only a small percentage 
would be needed to fund the EU budget (a 
‘politically’ favourable circumstance). Visibility 
could be ensured through an appropriate mention 
in fiscal receipts30.
The objective of making the VAT-based resource 
neutral for final consumers would require 
excluding from the assessment basis zero-rated 
transactions (on which no revenue is collected), 
which are applied to a number of basic goods 
by some member states. It could be argued that 
this would introduce inequality among EU final 
consumers with identical consumption patterns. 
However, in the absence of an EU fiscal power, a 
parallelism between EU revenue and the pattern 
of a broad national fiscal source seems a legitimate 
and ‘equitable’ solution for contributions paid 
directly by the public. This also provides a better 
rationale than the current conceptually debatable 
corrections, which are the origin of scarcely 
understandable discrepancies in per-capita 
contributions31.
As with any fiscal resource, there is a risk of 
avoidance. Available estimates show that VAT 
losses are significant32 and fraud may represent 
a large share. No member state is spared by VAT 
fraud. In this respect, the ‘transitional’ intra-
30 The details of this proposal are developed in Cipriani 
2014, op. cit., pp. 60-70.
31 See Cipriani 2014, op. cit., Figure 4 and Table 7.
32 According to a VAT gap study published by the Com-
mission, an estimated €177 billion in VAT revenue was 
lost in 2012 (€171 billion in 2011) due to non-compliance 
or non-collection. This corresponds to 16% of the total 
expected VAT revenue of 26 member states (see Euro-
pean Commission, Press release MEMO/14/602, 23 
October 2014, p. 3). See also European Parliament, Reso-
lution of 12 December 2013 on the call for a measurable 
and binding commitment against tax evasion and tax 
avoidance in the EU.
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community VAT regime plays an important role. 
Member states have no “certainty of being able to 
receive the revenues to which they are entitled”33. 
The domino effect on other taxation is a further 
concern34. Linking the various types of EU revenue 
to VAT could accentuate the European rationale of 
the tax and encourage initiatives to improve the 
efficiency of national systems.
Under this scenario, since the EU budget cannot 
run a deficit, the GNI resource would return 
to its original role as a balancing resource. This 
resource could also provide the potential for 
temporary arrangements if significant differences 
arose compared with the current burden-sharing 
between member states.
3. CONCLUSION
Difficulty in showing identifiable results achieved 
by EU funds35 and recurrent cases of their sub-
optimal use reduce confidence in the EU. This is 
also a matter of concern with regard to EU revenue, 
since its legitimacy depends on convincing 
taxpayers that EU funds are making a difference 
across Europe. Enhancing EU public trust requires 
action on both sides of the EU budget. 
The public’s trust would be revived by regulatory 
frameworks designed to achieve better spending 
than the member states could achieve alone, 
where, for example, absorption of funding would 
33 See European Commission, A common system of VAT, A 
programme for the Single Market, COM (96) 328, 22 July 
1996, p. 25.
34 As the VAT base represents a kind of ‘benchmark’ for all 
tax returns, VAT avoidance generates a ‘domino effect’ 
of simultaneous avoidance of direct taxation revenue 
and social security contributions (Tremonti and Vital-
etti (1991), La fiera delle tasse, Bologna, Il Mulino, p. 21).
35 The latest Commission report on the evaluation of the 
Union’s finances based on the results achieved (COM 
(2015) 313, 26 June 2015) confirms the difficulties noted 
in the past about reporting on the achievements of the 
EU funding policies and their added value compared to 
national spending alone.
not be an objective in itself and it would be possible 
to compare the expected and actual results of the 
programmes. This places a shared responsibility 
on the Commission, the European Parliament and 
the Council.
The introduction of a visible fiscal source to 
fund the EU budget could also be a means of 
enhancing taxpayer confidence. Visibility would 
not only show them that individual contributions 
are somewhat limited. It would also represent a 
counterweight to any possible future increase, as 
this would need to be adequately justified. The use 
of an existing tax, such as VAT, seems to fit the 
purpose.
Achieving the required renewal and reform at the 
EU and the national levels will not be a piece of 
cake. However, there seems to be no alternative if 
we wish to foster the general public’s support for 
the European integration project.
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CONTRIBUTION TO 
SESSION II OF THE 
WORKSHOP ON OWN 
RESOURCES
ANNEMIEKE BEUGELINK
Mr Giacomo Benedetto asked whether we can 
escape the “juste-retour” debate, when discussing 
a reform of the own resources system. This may 
be difficult to achieve in the short term but 
perhaps there are ways to alter this debate. There 
is an intrinsic link between a reform of the own 
resources system and a review of EU budget 
expenditure.; The challenge is to get away from 
a deadlock where there seems no clear way of 
changing either one profoundly.
In his introduction, Prof. Monti raised the question 
of whether one should consider earmarking certain 
revenue for certain expenditure. The principle of 
unity of the budget would be an argument against 
this, but a clearer separation and/or grouping 
of certain revenue sources and expenditure 
items may be an avenue to explore –- if only for 
analytical purposes – - to help change the juste-
retour debate. It might, perhaps, contribute to 
unlocking the zero-sum game which is paralysing 
not only a reform of the own resources system 
but also a review of EU expenditure. Additional 
benefits of such an analysis might be to better 
focusing of EU programmes on European public 
goods and performance, an improvement in the 
situation regardsing the sufficiency of payment 
appropriations in the budget, and, who knows, as 
increase in citizens interest in the EU budget.
Mr Tarschys has spoken and written about 
“Footloose Tax Bases” as a possible way of finding 
new EU revenue sources1. On page 3 of his paper 
he introduces the concept as follows: 
“The zero-sum game appears to be locked. But is it 
true that any new revenue for the EU is a national 
loss even in the first stage, before some of the money 
returns? This paper explores a tack other than that 
of transfer of fiscal competence: that of finding 
additional EU income in virgin pastures where 
national ministers of finance have not yet trod and 
cannot tread, or can do so only with the greatest 
difficulty. In a globalising world, there are potential 
public income sources that are not only untapped 
but even untappable for national governments, i.e. 
simply beyond their reach because several tax bases 
have become so footloose and ethericThe zero-sum 
game appears to be locked. But is it true that any 
new revenue for the EU is a national loss even in the 
first stage, before some of the money reverts? This 
paper explores a different tack than the transfer 
of fiscal competence: that of finding additional 
EU income in virgin pastures where national 
ministers of finance have not yet trod and cannot 
tread, or can do so only with the greatest difficulty. 
In a globalising world, there are potential public 
income sources that are not only untapped but even 
untappable for national governments, i.e. simply 
beyond their reach because several tax bases have 
become so footloose and etheric.” 
On page 9 of the paper, in the context of “raising 
resources for the collective need of the trade-
dependent economy” the author explains: 
“The guiding principle, then, should be to phase out 
the tug-of-war between the Union and its Member 
States over already exploited tax bases. Some 
sharing of such resources may still be necessary in 
the future, but the focus for the EU should be on 
1 Daniel Tarschys, Swedish Institute for European Policy 
Studies (SIEPS), “Entering a world of Footloose Tax 
Bases: Can the EU Generate Its Own Income?”, work-
shop on the Own Resources of the European Union, 
European University Institute, Florence, 24 April 2015. 
The content of this document is the sole responsibility 
of the author and constitutes a personal opinion.
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fresh receipts from activities immediately linked to 
the process of Europeanisation and globalisation. 
We should seek to identify sources of public revenue 
that are not easily or not at all within the reach of 
national governments, but come about or become 
available only through international exchange and 
cooperation. A small fraction of such gains could 
quite reasonably and even profitably be mobilised 
to pay for the collective action that is its necessary 
concomitant and precondition.” 
What if one were to link such new resources in 
some way or another to EU expenditure providing 
for a similar kind of “footloose” European public 
goods? In a 2011 publication, Mr Tarschys 
developed selection criteria and a three-stage test 
for categorising expenditure as European public 
goods2. Other authors have also written on the 
concept of European public goods3. For reasons 
of simplification one could make an analysis in 
which the GNI resource would be linked to EU 
programmes with a certain rationale4 of “national 
envelopes” (cohesion, rural development, 
fisheries), and one or more new own resources, 
based on “footloose tax bases”, linked to EU 
expenditure that can be characterised as “footloose” 
European public goods (notably, research, TENs, 
external action and administrative expenditure). 
In a digitalised and globalised world, and profiting 
from the Single Market, a customer in country X, 
for example, can now choose an energy service 
provider, which may get the electricity from 
country Y and/or be dependent on a pipeline in 
country Z. Regulation by the EU may save costs 
for customers (e.g. roaming). Public risk-taking to 
trigger more private long long-term investments, 
such as for in Galileo or the ESIF, should not 
2 Daniel Tarschys, Swedisch Institute for European Policy 
Studies (SIEPS), “The EU Budget: What Should Go In? 
What Should Go Out? – European Public Goods: Which 
Selection Criteria for the Multiannual Financial Frame-
work?”, 2011.
3 Also see, e.g., also the contribution by Mrs. Schratzenk-
raller to this workshop.
4 E.g. convergence, redistribution, intra-EU solidarity, 
incentives for Member States structural reforms, etc..
lead to a situation of privatisation of profits and 
socialisation of losses. One can imagine the type 
of services that the EU budget could help deliver 
and new resources in the form of fees/taxes, 
which may be conceived for the provision of such 
collective goods.
If there were a clearer separation of revenue and 
expenditure between what could be considered 
to be more “European” and what more “Member 
State-oriented/based”, it might influence the net-
contributor’s calculations of net contributors. 
Traditional own resources are obviously not 
included in the concept of “operational budgetary 
balances” and with the same logic one could 
also exclude EU expenditure for on “footloose” 
European public goods from such calculations5. 
Furthermore, there are good reasons to calculate 
net balances on the basis of a different methodology 
other than “operational net balances”. Mr Cipriani 
and Mr Pisani already illustrated this in 2004 with 
calculations that evaluate the economic impact 
of EU expenditure on the basis of “induced” 
production demand’6. This methodology would 
produce “win-win” outcomes for almost all 
Member States. 
Studying the economic and other impacts of EU 
expenditure is of wider importance, especially in 
the context of scarce resources, with a continuous 
search for “fiscal space”7, where performance or 
result-oriented budgeting should play a prominent 
role. Scrutiny of Member States’ economic and 
budgetary performance features high on the 
economic governance agenda. In the same vein, 
scrutiny by Member States of the implementation 
5 Expenditure on external action is already excluded; with 
regard to administrative expenditure different method-
ologies exist.
6 See Gabriele Cipriani, CEPS publication “Financing the 
EU budget, : Moving Forwards or Backwards”, 2014
7 See Marcel, Mario (2014) “Budgeting for fiscal space and 
government performance beyond the great recession”, 
Robinson, Marc (2014), “Spending Reviews” and Schick, 
Allen (2014), “the metamorphoses of performance bud-
geting”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol.13/2 , to be 
found here: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/
oecd-journal-onbudgeting_16812336 
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of “their” funds under shared management in 
terms of performance and regularity can, and 
should, also be improved.
If new footloose revenue sources and footloose 
European public goods were more clearly separated 
from the GNI resource and national envelope-
based EU programmes, this might also alter the 
situation as regards negotiations on payment 
appropriations in the EU budget. Currently, in 
order to strike a deal amongst themselves on the 
level of payments, Finance Ministers from “net-
receiver” and “net-contributor” countries may 
decide to restrict appropriations disproportionately 
under Headings 1a, 3, 4, and 5 so as to “spare” 
agricultural and cohesion spending. If this were 
no longer possible, there may be more incentives 
for peer review, a better assessment of needs, and 
improved forecasting.
Finally, new “footloose” resources for the EU 
budget might help raise citizen’s engagement with 
and scrutiny of the EU budget. Lucy Martin wrote 
a dissertation8 on the relation between taxation 
and political accountability, examining the effects 
of taxation on citizens’ behaviour. She argues that 
“taxation changes citizens’ preferences such that 
they are less tolerant of non-accountable behaviour 
by government”. She tested her theory, which 
is based on “loss aversion” mechanisms9, with 
experiments in Uganda. Put simply: the theory 
is that people care more about losses than gains; 
taxation is said to provide a better incentive for 
holding governments to account for lost income 
than non-earned aid received. Perhaps it is time 
to take a fresh look at the often-heard statement 
that citizens would not accept an EU tax, and take 
up the challenge of reviewing EU expenditure in 
pursuit of providing European public goods for 
the benefit of those citizens.
8 Lucy Martin, Yale University, “Taxation, Loss Aversion, 
and Accountability: Theory and Experimental Evidence 
for Taxation’s Effect on Citizen Behavior”, September 18, 
2014.
9 See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect 
theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 1979
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In debates about reform of the EU budget own 
resources system, more often than not the 
ruminations quickly gravitate towards the salient 
issue of identifying new alternative sources of 
finance. The European Parliament’s call for more 
“genuine own resources” and the discussions on 
the Commission proposals in 2011 exemplify this 
tendency. The press is inclined to pick up the issue 
under the catchphrases “a new European tax” or “a 
tax for Brussels”.
As a consequence, it is sometimes tempting to 
construe a binary opposition between “federalist” 
voices which call for more, or new, autonomous 
own resources on the one hand and “inter-
governmentalist” forces, embodied on the other 
hand by the main net contributing Member States 
in the Council, who prefer to keep an EU budget 
predominantly funded by GNI-based national 
contributions in order to maintain control and 
discipline. 
Admittedly, in a way, the stance that actors adopt 
(be they political or academic observers) regarding 
the nature of financing the EU budget might serve 
as a litmus test for their level of ambition regarding 
an “ever closer Union”. Those in favour of, say, 
a Financial Transaction Tax or a CO2 levy as a 
revenue source for the EU budget would qualify 
as integration-friendly, while those opposed 
would be seen as aiming to block any further 
supranationalisation of the EU’s institutional set-
up.
However, this dichotomy makes a caricature of an 
important debate which deserves a more nuanced 
appreciation. Indeed, looking at the relevant EP 
resolutions and Commission reports, the pleas for 
new own resources are never presented in such 
a simplified normative fashion, but are carefully 
framed within legal, economic and budgetary 
analysis. 
Importantly, the sometimes polarized dispute 
about new own resources should not stand in the 
way of looking at other, maybe less prominent 
possibilities for optimizing the functioning and 
added value of the EU budget’s revenue side. 
Therefore, in response to the question “which 
options for reform?”, one could conceive of at least 
three or four promising pathways for changing 
the status quo – short of introducing additional 
funding sources – which might still bring us 
closer to fulfilling more of the criteria which have 
been identified in the High Level Group’s First 
Assessment. 
1. Reforming existing own resources to make 
them simpler, more transparent and fairer. 
The VAT-based own resource springs to mind. 
There is ample room for simplification of the 
present statistical aggregate. Simplifying the tax 
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base would be a challenge, mainly because the 
present complexity is a result of successive steps to 
make the system “fair” by (notionally) simulating 
a harmonized tax base in a fragmented VAT 
landscape across the Member States. However, 
there may be ways to streamline it while still 
satisfying at least some aspects of the fairness 
criterion1.
A minor, but straightforward reform would be 
to further reduce the collection costs of customs 
duties, which would immediately decrease the 
residual GNI-based contribution.
Similarly, there might be ways to improve the 
GNI-based own resource. “GNI” is used because 
it is generally considered to be the best proxy 
of Member States’ ability to pay. It is generally 
considered to be a benchmark of the sufficiency 
criterion and it ensures the principle of budgetary 
equilibrium. However, the recent uproar after the 
2014 exercise balancing the VAT and GNI bases 
illustrated that this is not a flawless revenue source 
either. Several analyses have also underlined that 
it was not the GNI own resource as such but its 
increasing dominance of the budget (more than 
70%) which is considered problematic. Given its 
broad support across the political spectrum, one 
should in any case be highly cautious about fiddling 
with this crucial component of the revenue side. 
2. Changing the legal architecture, short of 
Treaty change, could also help streamline the 
financing side.
As a reminder, the present own resources system 
is based on a series of legal acts including 
implementing rules and “making available” 
regulations, anchored in different primary 
law articles, and therefore subject to different 
procedures2.
1 In the case of the VAT-based own resource, one could 
defend the viewpoint that “fairness” does not have to be 
an approximation of Member States’ ability to pay, but 
should instead reflect the taxpayer’s perspective.
2 As a reminder, the own resources legislative package 
adopted in May 2014 comprises the following acts: 
Again, there is room for improvements in 
transparency and coherence. Some steps in this 
direction have been taken: the new legislative 
package has clarified some of the grey zones and 
duplications compared to the previous set-up. It 
includes an implementing regulation according 
to Art.311(4), i.e. requiring the consent of the 
EP, a legal basis which has been used for the 
first time, thereby opening the door (just a little 
bit) to enhanced parliamentary scrutiny and 
accountability3.
The EP refrained from using the consent procedure 
to push through additional conditions. This 
would have jeopardized the very adoption of the 
implementing regulation according to Art. 311(4). 
a) The Own Resource Decision (ORD): Council Decision of 
26 May 2014 on the system of own resources of the EU 
(2014/335/EU, Euratom). Legal basis: Art. 311 TFEU: 
unanimity in Council, consultation of EP, ratification by 
national parliaments.
b) The Implementing Regulation: Council Regulation (EU, 
Euratom) No 608/2014 of 26 May 2014 laying down 
implementing measures for the system of own resources of 
the EU. Legal basis: Art. 311(4) TFEU: (QMV in Council 
after consent in EP. This is a new element under Lisbon, 
granting the EP at least some influence in the realm of OR 
legislation.)
c) The Making Available Regulation: Council Regulation 
(EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 of 26 May 2014 on the meth-
ods and procedure for making available the traditional, 
VAT and GNI-based own resources and on the measures 
to meet cash requirements (Recast). Legal base: Art. 322 
TFEU (QMV, consultation of EP).
 While these three acts formally follow different proce-
dural requirements, they were de facto negotiated at the 
same meetings and the various Council presidencies 
sought unanimous approval on the package as a whole.
3 The Commission had, for example, proposed to lay 
down the minimum call rates for the Financial Transac-
tion Tax to be made available as an own resource in the 
regulation. In this way, the EP would have gained a sig-
nificant say in the procedure, magnifying the “account-
ability” of the system. This proposal did not last long in 
the Council deliberations, and even if the FTT were to 
become the basis of an own resource, it would still be an 
additional obstacle to have its call rate defined anywhere 
other than in the ORD itself. The Council succeeded in 
limiting the scope of the IR because the content of the 
implementing regulation must be validated explicitly in 
the Own Resources Decision. 
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However, now that it is in place (its entry into force 
is pending until ratification of the own resources 
decision), the EP has a viable platform on which to 
exhaust the possibilities of this consent procedure 
more fully at the next possibility. 
3. Correction mechanisms can be abolished or 
replaced
Obviously, reform of correction mechanisms 
could be a point of departure for systemic changes. 
While they are intended to compensate for 
perceived injustices, they tend to create their own 
drawbacks, in particular in as far as they are not 
time-bound, not linked to a specific expenditure 
pattern, and they develop a life of their own. 
Once a Member State benefits from an abatement, 
it will not want to abandon it, even if the frame 
conditions which justified it in the first place are 
no longer the same.
Ever since the notorious “Fontainebleau” summit, 
correction mechanisms on the revenue side have 
had their place in the system, supplemented by 
“gifts” on the expenditure side in the MFF context. 
In-depth analysis and alternative proposals have 
been published (Commission 2011) and could be 
further developed.
4. Finally, other systemic changes in the budgetary 
logic could also bring us closer to fulfilling more 
of the criteria. Here, a few areas which might be 
worthwhile exploring in more depth will be hinted 
at:
· For the moment, the residual GNI-based 
own resource is the adjustment variable 
which serves to balance the budget – 
regardless of the origin of the imbalance 
(deviations in the level of budgeted 
revenue, higher – or lower – than expected 
disbursements in the course of budget 
execution etc.). It might be conceivable 
that an additional or alternative element 
of stability and predictability on the 
expenditure side (e.g. introduced via 
the Multiannual Financial Framework 
regulation and/or the financial regulation) 
would take over the role of residual balancing 
element. Such an expenditure item would 
by necessity have to be non-programmable 
and flexible in its application. Any analysis 
following such an approach would have to 
make a thorough distinction between the 
cash flow and the appropriations side (it 
would not be reasonable to count it against 
MFF ceilings). The budget would remain in 
equilibrium ex-ante and ex-post but would 
no longer be entirely expenditure driven.
· There are some perceived deficiencies 
which (certain voices in) the EP would 
like to see mitigated by a higher share of 
genuine own resources, for example the 
high level of RAL (reste à liquider), an 
abnormal backlog at the end of the year. 
In this context, changing the budgetary 
treatment of a surplus or of competition 
fines is sometimes proposed. This latter is 
a highly delicate area as the Commission 
must at all times maintain its independence 
in the legal proceedings and should not 
have a financial stake. 
· The definition of net balances could be 
broadened by also including secondary 
economic effects triggered by EU budget 
interventions in Member States, instead 
of only the immediate disbursement of 
allocated expenditure. This would arguably 
more accurately reflect the true costs and 
especially the real benefits of EU budget 
expenditure. The net budget balances 
may then not have to be construed as a 
zero-sum game (as the present method of 
operating budgetary balances does) and 
could thus moderate the oft-cited juste-
retour dilemma. Admittedly, it would be 
difficult to operationalize such an approach 
and Member States would be tempted 
to continue simulating the previous 
calculation.
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· In an “out of the box” thinking exercise, 
one could examine further deviations 
from certain principles, like the annuality 
or the universality principle, to see if they 
could open doors to a simpler, fairer or 
more effective budget. Such changes would 
obviously have their drawbacks inasmuch 
as they would contravene well-established 
budgetary principles.
To sum up: there are more options for reforming 
the own resources system than just searching 
for innovative revenue streams. The approaches 
listed above would not be the “quantum leap” that 
the introduction of a genuine new own resource 
would represent, but they would each have their 
own individual rationale and merit. As they are 
not mutually exclusive, combinations are also 
feasible. Their effects would be incremental but 
cumulative. Some of them might to a certain 
degree be realized in the course of the budgetary 
procedure. Others would entail new or amended 
secondary legislation under ordinary procedures 
with a qualified majority in the Council (like 
the Financial Regulation) or interinstitutional 
agreements. For more far-reaching “game-
changing” reforms, however, it will probably 
be impossible to circumvent the unanimity 
requirement of the MFF regulation, the own 
resources decision, or the Treaty itself. This is high 
politics, after all.
EU OWN RESOURCES: MOMENTUM FOR A REFORM ?54
HOW TO 
COMMUNICATE 
THE REFORM? 
INTRODUCTION 
ANNE MONTAGNON
Anne Montagnon heads the task force on own 
resources, which is a service set up in DG Budget 
to support the High Level Group on Own Resources 
chaired by Mario Monti, in close collaboration with 
the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union.
She started her career in the European Parliament 
and moved to the European Commission in 2001, 
where she held different positions in DG Budget, 
respectively in the units in charge of the multiannual 
financial framework, the financial regulation, and 
as assistant to the Director General.
She was born in Saint-Etienne, France, and holds a 
double master in political science (Grenoble, France 
and UCLA, USA) and European affairs (Brussels).
The content of this document is the sole responsibility 
of the author and constitutes a personal opinion. 
Professor Monti mentioned in his introduction 
that this issue was as crucial as it had been 
overlooked in the past, and that repeated failures 
to substantially reform own resources have led to 
an awareness of a need to do things differently. 
There are several issues to consider:
· communication as a continuous process, to 
keep this issue high on the agenda, and to 
build pressure to address it;
· communication to make a consensus 
emerge on the objective, and to convince 
the actors that will eventually decide on 
legislative changes.
Communication as a continuous process, to 
keep this issue high on the agenda and to build 
pressure to address it is essential to broaden 
ownership of the issue of own resources so that it 
is not only discussed at the inter-institutional level 
between the traditional actors (the Commission, 
which makes the proposals, the European 
Parliament and the Council, which legislate, and 
the Court of auditors, which gives an opinion). 
National leaders, political parties, and more 
generally stakeholders who are normally not part 
of the process until very late should be involved 
at a much earlier stage so that they become aware 
of the importance of the revenue side and of its 
constraints. The early and continuous involvement 
of national parliaments is one step in this direction, 
and the High Level Group on Own Resources is 
already engaged in an enhanced dialogue with 
them.
Own resources which finance the EU budget can 
indeed appear very dry and technical. They are 
governed by many layers of rules which have been 
added on top of each other over the past decades. 
It appears a difficult subject to discuss in simple 
terms and visibility could also be a double-edged 
sword and could backfire in the present climate.
We need to go past the technical aspect of this issue 
and demonstrate that the EU budget is a useful 
tool to solve or at least mitigate present problems 
(investment gap, external crises) and support top-
priority policy objectives (energy union, research, 
digital technology, climate action).
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Nevertheless, we know that own resources touch 
upon the foundations of the EU, the capacity of the 
organisation to grow and act. This is one reason 
why some Member States are keen on the own 
resource based on GNI, as they see it as a means 
of control over EU development. It seems simple, 
when agreement on the objectives is elusive, to be 
content with an agreement on the framing rules. It 
seems easier to agree on the length of the game and 
the size of the field than the strategy for winning.
COMMUNICATION TO MAKE A 
CONSENSUS EMERGE ON THE OBJECTIVE 
AND TO CONVINCE THE ACTORS 
THAT WILL EVENTUALLY DECIDE ON 
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
The first obstacle to overcome is convincing actors 
of the need for reform. The debate that followed the 
first working session of today’s workshop has laid 
out some good reasons for reform, but we should 
be attentive to the weight of such arguments when 
the discussion is at the highest political level. For 
instance, while everyone publicly deplores the 
complexity of the system, experience shows that 
simplification is not a strong enough argument in 
itself. 
Another misleading perception which is currently 
a great obstacle to reform is the idea prevalent in 
some MS that “real own resources” would make 
them lose control over the EU budget. They 
therefore defend the GNI-based OR as a means 
of keeping the EU in check. This view explains 
many of the misunderstanding concerning own 
resources. First, it overlooks the fact that any 
source of revenue identified in the Own Resources 
Decision – whether it is customs duties, VAT 
or GNI – belongs to the EU once the relevant 
amounts have been calculated for the year. It does 
not belong to national treasuries any more, and 
does not necessitate a decision at the national 
level. So, by definition, it is a real “own resource”. 
Moreover, the own resource decision needs to be 
ratified by national parliaments and includes a 
binding ceiling. 
Second, control by national authorities on the EU 
budget is exercised on expenditure, not on revenue. 
It is exercised first when the Multiannual Financial 
Framework is adopted and its ceilings set, and then 
on the occasion of each annual budget. As the EU 
budget must always be in balance, the revenue to 
ensure its financing is calculated automatically to 
cover the expenditure which has been decided.
However, what the so-called “national contributions” 
have produced over the years is an ever-acute 
feeling in our Member States and among our 
citizens that the EU is only a cost for the national 
budget which has to compete with other costs in 
times of austerity. This was not always the case. 
The composition of own resources has changed 
tremendously over the years, and this has made 
budgetary negotiations between Member States 
ever more acrimonious and bitter, with an 
increasing focus on the very artificial notion of 
net balances. 
However, as several speakers have explained 
today, the GNI-based own resource is not as 
straightforward or as fair as it seems. There are 
other possible paths to follow to change the usual 
preconceptions and mentality, and some new 
needs should be taken into account to promote a 
renewed budget. In other words, some concepts 
like net balances, GNI, the role of the EU budget 
and the role of external instruments of a purely 
intergovernmental nature which are gradually 
pervading the EU budget should not remain 
unchallenged when they are instrumental in 
perpetuating the deadlock.
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This workshop has shown the many challenges that 
designing a reform of the own resources system 
faces, with the decision-making mechanism 
provided for by the Treaties representing a 
significant obstacle to any major changes in the 
financing of the EU budget.
Communicating a possible reform does not 
appear to be any simpler, but is crucial for the 
sake of simplicity, transparency and democratic 
accountability, which are three of the guiding 
principles enshrined in the mandate of the High-
Level Group (HLG) on Own Resources. This 
implies that communication of the reform should 
already be taken into account when shaping the 
overhaul of the system. In its first assessment 
report, the HLG itself notes that the viability of 
reform recommendations will depend not only on 
the economic soundness of the proposals but also 
on careful consideration of the institutional and 
political aspects of the reform process.
During the debate, various interventions have 
highlighted a number of points and questions 
that have the potential to play an important 
role in communicating a possible reform and 
could therefore be worth already exploring and 
investigating in further detail in the review phase 
of the system. 
COULD THE CONTENT OF THE REFORM 
HELP TO COMMUNICATE IT?
If the option of introducing a new own resource 
is chosen, this is likely to attract attention and 
(negative) reactions mainly from the sector(s) 
on which the new resource has a direct impact. 
However, the new resource could gain support if it 
contributes to addressing widely perceived issues 
that cannot easily be solved at national level, but 
necessitate joint action. In his paper, Professor 
Tarschys draws attention to the emergence of 
footloose tax bases, which hinder the effective 
financing of public goods, and are often linked to 
the digital economy and its ever-increasing role in 
today’s world. Other participants have said that the 
increasing awareness of the challenges posed by 
corporate tax avoidance could create momentum 
for joint action to tackle this phenomenon. Should 
these points be taken into account when examining 
possible options for new own resources? In addition, 
could the fact that it proves difficult to effectively 
address an issue at national level help explain the 
rationale behind the sharing of the proceeds of a new 
resource between the EU and its Member States? 
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SHOULD COMMUNICATION OF THE 
REFORM FOCUS ONLY ON THE REVENUE 
SIDE OF THE EU BUDGET? OR SHOULD 
IT ALSO CONCERN THE EXPENDITURE 
SIDE?
The mandate of the HLG is limited to the revenue 
side of the budget. However, citizens are more 
likely to be interested in the public goods that they 
get through the budget rather than in how these 
goods are financed. A number of interventions, 
including in this session, have called for further 
reform of the expenditure side of the budget. In its 
first assessment report, the HLG says that “there 
is an obvious disenchantment when it comes 
to both the quantity and the structure of public 
goods as they are reflected through existing EU 
policies”. Should the communication of a possible 
own resources reform explain the added value of the 
EU budget and what this can (and is expected to) 
deliver? Should the message clarify how the reform 
is meant to increase the effectiveness of the budget 
in delivering public goods for European citizens? 
COULD A REFORM OF THE 
SYSTEM BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
CHALLENGE PRECONCEIVED IDEAS 
AND MISCONCEPTIONS THAT MAY 
SOMETIMES SURROUND THE EU 
BUDGET?
This question is closely related to the previous 
one. A number of preconceived ideas sometimes 
appear to surround the EU budget. Interestingly, 
misconceptions may also concern the revenue side 
of the budget, possibly due to the lack of clarity of 
the current system. For example, some comments 
by readers in the web editions of authoritative 
financial newspapers seem to show that some 
citizens are convinced that VAT proceeds mainly 
go to the EU, whereas they are in fact a significant 
source of revenue for national budgets and the 
current VAT-based own resource of the EU is 
mainly a statistical resource, with a capped base 
and a standard call rate of just 0.30% (and a reduced 
rate for some Member States). The European 
Commission has devoted a page on its website to 
“EU budget: Myths and Facts”, listing more than 
ten preconceived ideas (e.g. “The EU budget is 
enormous!”; “The EU budget is constantly on the 
rise, whereas national governments are cutting 
their spending!”; and “The bulk of EU expenditure 
goes on administration!”) and rebutting them 
with data and information. Should communication 
of the own resources reform include such data and 
information? Or would the message become too 
complex? 
SHOULD COMMUNICATION OF 
THE REFORM BE TAILORED TO THE 
DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE REFORM 
PROCESS AND TO THE DIFFERENT 
STAKEHOLDERS, INCLUDING CITIZENS?
A possible reform of the financing of the EU 
budget involves different phases, as well as many 
stakeholders both at EU and national level (e.g. 
citizens, EU institutions, national governments 
and national parliaments). The creation of the HLG 
and its mandate show awareness of this complexity 
and of the need to involve stakeholders from an 
early stage in the debate. It is the first time that 
an inter-institutional group has been tasked with a 
thorough review of the own resources system, with 
the direct involvement of the European Parliament, 
the Council and the European Commission. The 
review process includes the active participation of 
national parliaments, which may provide input to 
the HLG and will assess the outcome of its work in 
the context of an inter-institutional conference to 
be convened in 2016. These elements appear to offer 
a transparent approach in which communication 
of the possible reform characterises each phase of 
the review process and possibly evolves with it. In 
addition, should messages be fine-tuned according 
to the stakeholders? Institutional actors may be 
more interested than citizens in technical aspects. 
For example, at the end of 2014, higher-than-
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usual annual adjustments of the GNI- and VAT-
based own resources showed that these resources 
may be sometimes less predictable than usually 
thought, with the Council considering that the 
short regulatory deadline for payment may have 
significant fiscal implications for some Member 
States. In many national budgets, the contribution 
to the EU budget appears as an item of expenditure. 
If a reform proposal seeks to ensure a mix of rather 
predictable own resources, could this message be of 
particular interest to national stakeholders and the 
Council? 
WHO SHOULD BE IN CHARGE OF 
COMMUNICATING A REFORM OF THE 
SYSTEM?
It can be expected that the European Parliament, 
which has long pushed for an overhaul of the 
own resources system, would be committed 
to communicating a possible reform. In its 
first assessment report, the HLG said that a 
precondition for any progress with reform is that 
all those involved in any overhaul of the system 
acknowledge that, from both an economic and a 
political perspective, the EU budget has positive 
spill-over effects, thus representing much more 
than a zero-sum game with net beneficiaries and 
net contributors. At the same time, the HLG invited 
all stakeholders and “especially the European 
Parliament, the European Commission, the Council 
and the national parliaments of the Member States 
to embrace ambitious objectives and to work in a 
spirit of cooperation”. Should this joint effort also 
concern the communication aspects of the reform?
SOME KEY MESSAGES
All the above-mentioned questions may be 
relevant when considering how to communicate 
a possible reform of the system. It can be noted 
that in its push to change the financing of the 
EU budget the European Parliament has already 
identified a series of key messages, for example in 
its 2007 resolution on the future of the European 
Union’s own resources. These principles, which 
can help both the design of the reform and its 
communication, include: 
· the reform aims to improve the 
effectiveness of the EU budget, by shifting 
the focus of budgetary discussions between 
decision-makers from geographically pre-
allocated expenditure in a “juste retour” 
perspective to priorities with EU added 
value;
· the principle of fiscal sovereignty of the 
Member States is to be fully respected; 
· the reform is to be fiscally neutral, 
without any increase in either total public 
expenditure or the tax burden on citizens; 
and
· the reform will not change the size of the 
EU budget.
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The European institutions have been very timid 
about engaging in serious discussions on the 
financing system for the European project. The 
“own resources” dossier was already opened in 
1962, together with the development of the first 
common policy and the reinforcement of the role 
of the European Parliament (EP). Negotiations 
lasted several years and led to probably the most 
serious institutional crisis in European Union 
history.
After the decision on own resources in the 
seventies, “Pandora’s box” was again opened in 
the eighties, with the introduction of the so-called 
“fourth resources”, a top-up paid by the Member 
States according to the size of their economies 
(GDP/GNI). Other decisions can be mentioned, 
such as the introduction and capping of the VAT 
resource and the introduction of the UK rebate 
(1984).
The European Parliament set its vision on the 
subject in a resolution1 of 2007. After having 
followed the “big bargains” around the 2014-2020 
Multiannual Financial Framework, the EP linked 
its final approval to an agreement to start a serious 
discussion on the reform of own resources. 
Some may suggest that each time the EU wants to 
avoid a problem, it creates a working group, but it 
is also fair to say that to solve a complex problem 
like EU financing the way out can be through a 
group with a lucid awareness of the problems and 
of the difficult political environment. The high 
level of the persons appointed to the group and the 
necessity of modifying a system judged by most as 
opaque, undemocratic and unfair could create the 
momentum for a step forward on this subject. 
LESSONS FROM THE PAST (ECSC)
It may be useful to look back at the history of 
own resources in the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). Three elements are worth 
taking into account.
1 EP resolution of 29/3/2007 on the future of own 
resources P6(2007)98, based on the Lamassoure report, 
A6-0066/2007.
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a) Limited autonomy
The financing of the ECSC is often referred to as 
a good example to follow. The High Authority was 
entitled to finance its activities through genuine 
European taxes on the production of coal and 
steel, and it also had the ability to contract loans. 
In reality, while this model was excellent in theory 
it did not guarantee the real autonomy of the 
ECSC in practice. 
After the failure of the European Defence 
Community in August 1954, Jean Monnet, 
President of the High Authority, understood that 
autonomy could not go against the will of the 
Member States. The High Authority changed, 
albeit informally, the procedures set in the 
Treaty and the Council was not only consulted 
in advance but the High Authority awaited its 
“informal” approval before presenting proposals. 
This pragmatic, but important, change to the spirit 
of the Treaty irritated the Assembly, which asked 
to be consulted too, and in some cases influenced 
decisions. The rules in the Treaty were then 
pragmatically changed and the autonomy of the 
High Authority was severely reduced. 
b) Neutral own resources 
The European taxes of the ECSC were re-
distributed in the same policy area. Similarly, the 
own resources were mainly collected on imports 
and were well accepted because they constituted a 
protection of agricultural and industrial products. 
This facilitated the acceptance of the own 
resources mechanism, and there was no feeling 
of competition between national and European 
taxes. This is another element to take into account.
c) Direct financing by Member States
One of the differences and originalities of the 
European construction with respect to classic 
international organizations is its financing system, 
deriving not from direct contributions but through 
a system called own resources. This had been 
true until GNI resources gradually dominated 
the revenue side of the EU budget. However, 
this problem already appeared during the ECSC. 
Around 1960 the High Authority reached the 
maximum of 1% that it was allowed to raise in 
taxes and it duly presented a proposal to go over 
this limit to the Member States. The Council/
Member States refused to adopt the proposal 
and preferred to directly pay contributions to the 
ECSC budget linked to GNP. This contribution 
reduced the prerogative of the High Authority to 
set the budget as in practice the Member states 
thus became entitled to fix the upper limit of 
the budget. This is another element to take into 
consideration in presenting new proposals.
MERITS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE 
CURRENT SYSTEM
Most of the literature on the subject is critical of the 
current system2. The High Level Group on Own 
Resources chaired by Prof. Mario Monti received a 
mandate to “review the own resources system guided 
by the overall objectives of simplicity, transparency, 
equity and democratic accountability”. The Joint 
Declaration by all the institutions implicitly 
recognised that the current system is complex, 
non-transparent, unfair and non-democratic. 
All these elements are very important and in 
themselves are already good reasons for a change 
but they are probably not the main weaknesses of 
the system. 
During the periodic bargaining around the 
Multiannual Financial Framework, each finance 
minister evaluates spending only in function 
of so-called juste retour, but not from either the 
subsidiarity or from the European added value 
angles. If a policy proposed can bring more funds 
than those paid into the EU budget, then it is a 
good policy. The concept of European public good 
is abandoned. 
2 For all the EP resolutions of 29/3/2007 on the future of 
own resources, see P6(2007)98, based on the Lamas-
soure report, and A6-0066/2007 and the First assess-
ment report of the High Level Group on Own Resources, 
December 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/hlgor/
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Over time, the fourth resource passed from being 
a marginal top-up to ensure the balance of the 
EU budget to being by far the most important 
resource of the EU budget. “Nationalisation” of EU 
own resources added to the non-respect of basic 
principles, such as simplicity, transparency, equity 
and democratic accountability, and rendered the 
current system largely obsolete and not serving 
the purposes for which EU own resources were 
created.
Another consequence of “juste retour” is the 
introduction of successive correction mechanisms 
which create further disparities between Member 
States, and ultimately taxpayers. 
In fact the criticisms do not only come from 
the European Parliament, the Commission and 
academic literature, but a majority of Member 
States also recognise all or some of these 
shortcomings. This recognition is, however, not 
sufficient to launch a spontaneous reform of the 
system and there is no automatism between the 
awareness of weakness of the system and the will 
to change it.
If the current system has survived criticisms for 
several decades, it is because it has some merits, 
as recognised in the Assessment Report of the 
HLGOR, such as a rather reliable and sufficient 
supply of finance, and easy collection.
To conclude on this point, all the participants at 
the workshop of 24 April 2015 were unanimous in 
recognising the imperative that the EU institutions 
make all possible efforts to reform the system.
THE MOMENTUM FOR REFORM 
During the workshop, Mr. Lamassoure said “The 
reform of own resources is a major challenge. Getting 
a consensus is an impossible task, but necessary, so 
the HLGOR can only succeed”. 
The agreement of all the institutions, including 
the Council, which is probably the most resistant 
to changes, to create such a group has put the 
problem of financing the EU back on the political 
agenda. Most Member States have serious 
complaints against at least some aspects of the 
current system. The moment when the UK, the 
major beneficiary of the correction mechanism, 
is asking for major reforms of the EU rules could 
open the opportunity of adding the reform of EU 
financing to the package of possible reforms to 
discuss.
In spite of the attempts by the Parliament and 
the Commission to push for a reform of the 
own resources system and of a generalised 
dissatisfaction on the part of most Member States, 
this dossier remains one of the most complicated 
because of its implications and the possible 
reactions of public opinion.
The motivation to modify the system in place is 
reduced by the swift functioning of the current 
system. In fact, the GNI resource guarantees 
control by Member States, it is easy and cheap 
to collect apart from the cost paid back to the 
Member States, and, last but not least, maintaining 
the current system avoids heated discussions 
among the Council’s Members, and eventually in 
the national parliaments. The current system is 
considered, by some, ideal for financing the EU, 
basically for two main reasons: a) MSs contribute 
to the EU budget in line with their economic 
capacity (principle of equity); and b) they have the 
necessary administrative structures to collect and 
process own resources more efficiently than any 
other EU body.
Nevertheless, a reform is necessary if we want 
to achieve a system that is more transparent, 
accountable, democratic and fair. Facing another 
negotiation of the Multiannual Financial 
Framework without reforming the own resources 
system will condemn the EU to focusing more on 
“horse trading” than on genuine efforts to find 
European added value measures. 
To conclude on this point, the HLGOR should 
present options for alternatives to the current 
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system, but the momentum goes beyond own 
resources. With the discussion opened about 
reforming some of the EU mechanisms at the 
request of the UK government, discussions on 
giving a new impetus to eurozone policies and the 
necessity of using financial resources in a way more 
focused on results, while possibly abandoning 
some existing policies, could create a favourable 
environment for a reform of the OR mechanisms. 
Missing this opportunity will reduce the possibility 
of re-launching the European project. 
WHICH AMBITIONS FOR A FINANCING 
SYSTEM?
There is no shortage of ideas or of technical 
solutions for reforming the current OR system. 
Academics have greatly contributed to this debate. 
During this seminar, several options have been 
circulated with different emphases, such as a 
Financial Transaction Tax, a Financial Activities 
Tax, a Departure/Flight Duty Tax, Value Added 
Tax, an Energy/CO2 Levy, Corporate Income Tax, 
a Tax on SMS and a Tax on Digital Companies.3
The idea presented by Daniel Tarschys that 
subsidiarity should apply to the reformed system 
has attracted some interest.4 EU fiscal policy 
should aim at areas not in competition with 
Member States, in particular tapping digital 
companies, which take the most advantage of 
operating beyond the boundaries of the national 
fiscal systems. 
3 See Margit Schratzenstaller’s contribution, in which she 
submits the “candidate” taxes to a number of sustain-
ability criteria, such as regional attribution, negative 
cross-border externalities, mobility of tax base, short-
term volatility, long-term yield (revenue elasticity), visi-
bility and equity of the gross burden at the national level.
4 Daniel Tarschys, Swedish Institute for European Pol-
icy Studies (SIEPS), Entering a World of Footloose Tax 
Bases: Can the EU Generate Its Own Income?
Modification of the own resources system 
cannot be a shortcut to a revolution where the 
Commission, and eventually the EP, gain “federal” 
competences, giving the EU full fiscal autonomy. 
The real objective is to create a balanced package 
where each Member State can find some advantage, 
where EU competences, notably of the EP, in this 
matter can be extended, but where all may find 
elements of discontent, but not enough to unwrap 
the package.
The EU is a complex mechanism with inter-
governmental elements prevailing over a sui 
generis federalist approach (community method). 
Any balanced solution with a possibility of success 
should take into account the Member States’ 
interests. A sustainable reform should respect a 
number of principles which might even appear 
to be contradictory: a) the right of initiative of 
the Commission; b) the decision-making role 
of the European Parliament, which represents 
the taxpayers; c) involvement of the European 
Council, the Council and the Member State 
Governments in the decision; d) the role of the 
national parliaments, which play an important 
role in the approval process. 
The first assessment report of the HLGOR makes 
the perfect synthesis: the reform “should be based 
on the merge of national interests with a higher 
European interest”. The EU budget, and indeed 
the EU as a whole, is much more than a zero-sum 
game. Even in the past, difficulties have opened new 
avenues for a step forward. 
To conclude, the HLGOR should assemble a 
package in line with its mandate and in the narrow 
space left by the limits mentioned above, but the 
success of the own resources reform should be seen 
in a wider context, which is beyond the mandate of 
the group and which touches not only the revenue 
side of the budget but also the expenditure. This 
will be the task of the EU institutions, unless they 
modify the HLGOR’s mandate by enlarging it to 
the expenditure side of the budget. 
EU OWN RESOURCES: MOMENTUM FOR A REFORM ?63
The same conclusion was reached in a seminar 
organised by the German Federal Ministry of 
Finance,5 where it was stated that “the issue of the 
expenditure side needs to be incorporated into the 
discussion on possible reform of the EU’s finances. If 
EU spending were to be targeted more intensively at 
financing European public goods, this could create 
genuine European added value”.
A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR THE REFORM
The objective of this article is not to indicate a 
magic solution to such a complex issue, but to 
indicate some guidelines which can be taken 
into account by those who decide. It is essential 
to establish a new governance of own resources, 
which should be part of the new own resources 
mechanism. 
Maintain a percentage of GNI: looking at the 
experience of the past, GNI has several advantages 
– simplicity, transparency and fairness – but its 
major disadvantage is that it is not an own resource. 
Nevertheless, the GNI measure reassures the 
Member States that they remain in command of 
the global financing of the EU budget, and that the 
revenue side of the budget cannot expand without 
their consent. It is possible that a lower limit of the 
GNI resource could be inserted to guarantee that 
it cannot be replaced by EU taxes. 
There should be a Council decision and 
national parliament ratification authorizing 
a limited number of taxes to be used to finance 
the EU budget. The list of potential taxes should 
be as large as possible. These taxes should not be 
seen as compulsory sources of financing the EU 
budget and their use can be decided in the yearly 
implementation. For each tax, Member States 
could even envisage an upper limit.
The Commission should be mandated to present 
a proposal for the financing of the budget in the 
framework of the annual budgetary procedure, 
5 Seminar on Future of EU-Finances, Federal Ministry of 
Finance, Berlin, 10th July 2014. 
specifying the planned revenue for each tax. 
The European Parliament should be entrusted 
to decide which among the authorized taxes can 
be used and at which level. The Council should be 
consulted by the EP with the consent procedure 
(i.e. the Council can unanimously reject a 
Parliament decision).
an opt-out clause, with penalization, might be 
included: The Council can decide on a request 
by a Member State to apply an opt-out excluding 
the MS from implementing a specific tax on its 
territory. The Council should add a penalty when 
the use of this possibility is requested by a Member 
State. Countries refusing to implement EU taxes 
would be penalized.
Regarding subsidiarity of the fiscal policy, once 
the framework is established and unanimously 
approved by the Council and ratified by the 
national parliaments, the EU institutions should 
have the autonomy to decide without seeking 
the approval of governments and/or national 
parliaments. 
There should be a duty to inform national 
parliaments. As the EU budget has an impact on 
national economies and budgets, the EP has the 
duty to inform the national parliaments of the 
state of play of EU own resources and the likely 
impact on national budgets as part of its economic 
governance, in particular during the European 
Semester.
COMMUNICATING THE REFORM
In a period of increasing mistrust towards Europe 
and its institutions, explaining the introduction 
of a new EU tax will not be an easy task, but it 
is crucial to make the EU financing system 
acceptable to public opinion. 
Achieving a complex reform but failing in 
communicating it can produce more damage 
than the advantages deriving from the solution. 
Leadership is essential in presenting the reform in 
EU OWN RESOURCES: MOMENTUM FOR A REFORM ?64
such a way as to gain the support of at least part of 
the public opinion.
Communication is essential, as the own resources 
decision will be submitted for ratification by the 
national parliaments. One of the basic principles 
is that this reform is not a new system but the 
replacement of an old and obsolete mechanism, 
and that the change should not impact the share 
of individual Member States. On the contrary, the 
reform should reduce the impact for most of the 
Member States due to the fact that some of the taxes 
could not be attributed at the national level (i.e. 
taxes imposed on transactions by multinationals 
across Europe).
If some of the new European taxes tap revenues 
and companies (e.g. the digital economy) beyond 
the reach of Member States6 currently subject to tax 
avoidance, it could be easier to explain the reform 
to public opinion and the national parliaments.
The communication should probably present 
a wider context than merely reform of the EU 
own resources, and present a complete picture 
explaining the object of the revenues generated 
by the new mechanisms in terms of financing EU 
policies.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, reform of the own resources is 
an almost impossible task, but this article has 
attempted to explain that there is a positive 
conjunction of elements:
· A largely shared conviction that the current 
system is unfair and obsolete;
· A common feeling that the correction 
mechanisms are not justified, but difficult 
to suppress outside a wider reform;
· The UK request for a reform of EU 
mechanisms;
6  See the article by Daniel Tarschys above
· The will of the Juncker Commission to limit 
EU legislation and to focus more on results, 
opening up to a reform of the expenditure 
side of the budget.
The reform of the own resources system should 
not be a revolution, and it should not give full 
fiscal autonomy to the EU institutions. The reform 
should replace an outdated and obsolete system 
while respecting a number of red lines, such 
as respect for the prerogatives of the Member 
States, and an increase in the responsibility of the 
European Parliament in the fiscal domain (no 
taxation without representation).
The High Level Group on Own Resources has a 
unique opportunity to present a coherent package 
of proposals to implement a new financing 
mechanism, but these proposals will not be 
sufficient. The reform of the system financing 
EU resources should be part of a more ambitious 
package of reform to re-launch the European 
Union: a new financing system, a deepening of 
Eurozone governance (with a separate budget), 
a more strict application of subsidiarity to limit 
EU legislation, a capacity for leadership on the 
geopolitical stage, and last but not least a common 
electoral system. 
To conclude, the seminar organised by the 
European University, was more than an exchange 
of reflections between academics. Enlightened by 
Prof. Monti’s opening speech, all the participants 
tried to be as concrete as possible and presented 
their opinions in a very open way. The collection 
of ideas that emerged during the workshop aims 
to be a set of tools for all those, be they politicians, 
students or scholars, who wish to study this 
important issue in the progress of European 
integration.
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FURTHER CONCLUSIONS
Seven months after the EUI seminar on own 
resources, the European Commission took 
a decision on own resources which can be 
considered innovative to say the least. It seems 
worth mentioning the Commission’s decision, as 
the approach by the Commission and the Member 
States might influence reflections on the evolution 
of own resources and the follow-up by the High 
Level Group on Own Resources.
On 15 October 2015, the European Council 
committed the EU and its Member States7 to 
increase “cooperation with Turkey and step up their 
political and financial engagement substantially 
within the established framework”. Following this 
conclusion, on 24 November the Commission took 
an autonomous decision on “the coordination of 
the actions of the Union and of the Member States 
through a coordination mechanism – the Refugee 
Facility for Turkey”.8 To finance this facility, the 
Commission foresees an intervention from the 
EU budget up to a level of 500m Euros and a direct 
intervention by the Member States of 2,500m 
Euros, as assigned revenues to the EU Budget9 and 
with the repartition of GNI.10
The “assigned revenue” mechanism is foreseen 
by the Financial Regulation, Article 21 (2) (b), 
and indeed covers “financial contributions from 
Member States and third countries … to certain 
external aid projects or programmes financed by 
the Union and managed by the Commission on 
their behalf ”.
7 See the Conclusions of the European Council, 15 Octo-
ber, 2015.
8 Commission Decision of 24 November 2015, C (2015) 
9500 final. 
9  Recital 15 establishes that “Financial contributions from 
Member States should be included in the Union”s budget 
as external assigned revenue in accordance with Arti-
cle 21 (2) (b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 966/2012 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the 
Union and repealing Council regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No. 1605/2002.
10 See art. 4 and the annex to the Decision.
This mechanism has so far been, very usefully, 
used to permit the participation of third countries 
in EU programmes or to allow a limited number 
of Member States which wish to to contribute 
to Trust Funds launched and managed by the 
Commission.11 The novelty in this case is that 
financing of a conclusion by the European Council 
is made by all 28 Member States, which are 
expected to contribute a relatively large amount 
with the standard GNI key used to calculate the 
normal financing of the EU budget. Through this 
mechanism, the Commission has for the first time 
created a “fifth resource” outside the procedures 
foreseen by the Treaties to finance EU decisions 
topping up the EU Budget. 
Even if this exceptional measure should be 
assessed in connection with the urgency of the 
situation created by the migration flux towards 
Europe, the fact that all the Member States 
finance a community decision on the basis of 
the GNI share could raise questions about the 
procedure followed. These amounts will be 
outside the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial 
Framework, and do will not follow the revision 
procedure involving the European Parliament 
and the national parliaments. Doubts could also 
be raised about respect for the principle of unity 
of the budget and about the extension of control 
mechanisms, the involvement of the Court 
of Auditors, the discharge procedure, and the 
capacity of the Commission to enforce its decision. 
These doubts were voiced by some MEPs during 
the Commission’s presentation of this decision.12
This example confirms that, in spite of 
Euroscepticism, the need for intervention by the 
European Union is still very strong. The challenges 
11 See A. D’Alfonso and B.Immenkamp, EU Trust Funds 
for external action, European Parliament, PE 572.797, 
http://w ww.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
BRIE/2015/572797/EPRS_BRI(2015)572797_EN.pdf 
12 See the debate in the EP committee of 10 Decem-
ber 2015 on budgets following the presentation by 
the Commission, at point 11 of the Agenda http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/
video?event=20151210-0900-COMMITTEE-BUDG 
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of our century, such as the displacement of 
refugees, the migration flux, coordination of the 
fight against the terrorism, reinforcement of the 
security of EU citizens, support and coordination 
of the energy and transport sectors, and support 
for measures to combat climate changes, to 
mention just a few, are areas where the subsidiarity 
of EU intervention to complement Member State 
initiatives is not questioned. On the contrary, the 
absence of Europe is often criticised as one of the 
causes of the gravity of problems which have a 
worldwide dimension. To face these challenges, 
the EU needs financial resources, even beyond the 
current ceilings. This can be achieved by a new 
European fiscal policy. The introduction of EU 
taxes can be better explained and accepted by EU 
citizens if the objectives of EU policies are clearly 
identified and shared.
To conclude, the present times offer a perfect 
window of opportunity for reform, and ideas on 
technical solutions are abundant, as the workshop 
organised by the EUI in April proved. The High 
Level Group chaired by Prof. Monti has the 
authority to present ambitious proposals and 
convince the EU prime ministers and heads of state 
of the necessity of a reform of the own resources 
system to facilitate the European dimension of 
Member State initiatives.
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ANNEX I
PROGRAMME
WORKSHOP ON OWN RESOURCES  
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
BADIA FIESOLANA,  
24 APRIL 2015
RATIONALE
 
In 1952 the ECSC was financed by a European tax. The situation has evolved considerably since then 
and the problem of own resources has been at the centre of tense political and institutional discussions, 
including during the last negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework. The current system 
raises many criticisms but it also has some merits. The workshop aims to openly discuss this subject and 
to collect contributions around the following themes:
10.30   Opening Chair: Pasquale Ferrara
   Keynote introduction: Prof. Mario Monti
DEBATE 
11.30   SESSION 1: 
   Why a Reform? – Chair: Alfredo De Feo (EUI)
   Session I will address the following questions:
• Which fiscal model might inspire a reform of the own resources (fiscal federalism, fiscal   
 autonomy)? 
• Could a reform lead to a reduction in dominant positions? What motivation might   
 Members States have to change the own resources regime? 
• If reform of own resources leaves the Member States in control of their share, is it a real   
 reform and what would be the advantage of changing the current system? 
• Is it possible to reform the financing mechanism without reforming the policies    
 financed by the budget and the role of the budget itself in economic governance?
   Introduction: Daniel Tarschys (Sv), Sergio Fabbrini (It)
   Discussants: Carlos Closa (EUI), Milan Cvikl (Court of Auditors)
   Contributions: Gregory Claeys (Brueghel), Jorge Nunez (CEPS)
13.00 – 14.30 Lunch
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14.30   SESSION 2:
   Which options for a Reform? – Chair: Brigid Laffan (EUI)
   Session II will address the following questions:
• Numerous tax models have been suggested. What are the criteria that could be used   
 for a selection? Which model scores closest to the criteria and how can the redistributive role of  
 the EU budget be maintained? 
• If the GNI resource cannot be replaced by one or more taxes, is it possible to create a   
 modular system including GNI which leaves options open to the Member States? 
• Which incentives could be offered to the Member States for them to adopt an alternative   
 fiscal model? 
• Legitimacy and responsibility: which role can be attributed to the different institutions   
 in a different EU fiscal model? 
   Introduction: Alain Lamassoure, Margit Schratzenstaller (AT), 
   Jacques Le Cacheux (FR)
   Discussants: Michael Bauer (D), Giacomo Benedetto (UK)
   Contributions:  Gabriele Cipriani (ECA), Annemieke Beugelink (PE)
16.00 – 16.15 Coffee break
16.15   Round table. How to communicate the reform? 
   The round table will address the following questions
• What message should be conveyed to get the support of public opinion and convince national  
 politicians to support the reform?
• How can a switch from an indirect to a direct taxation mechanism avoid increasing negative  
 reactions to the EU?
   Moderator: Anne Montagnon
   Discussants: James Elles, Monica Frassoni 
   Contribution: Alessandro D’Alfonso
17.30   Conclusion: Brigid Laffan 
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Bologna) and a master’s degree in European law (College of Europe, Bruges), in 1978 he joined the 
European Court of Auditors where he has spent his whole career. 
His most recent book “Financing the EU Budget - Moving forward or backwards?” was published in 
2014.
GREGORY CLAEYS 
Gregory Claeys joined the Brussels-based think-tank Bruegel as a research fellow in 2014. His main 
research interests include financial economics, international macroeconomics and finance, central 
banking and European governance. Before joining Bruegel he worked inter alia as a macroeconomist 
in the Economic Research Department of the French bank Crédit Agricole where he was in charge of 
forecasts and analysis of economic developments in various countries. 
He is the author of several academic publications in his fields of interest.
CARLOS CLOSA 
Carlos Closa Montero is Professor and Director of the Research Area European, Transnational and 
Global Governance at the Global Governance Programme of the European University Institute (EUI), 
Florence. He has published a large number of articles on EU citizenship, the EU constitutional structure 
and the relationship with the Member States in important journals such as Common Market Law Review 
and the Journal of European Integration.
EU OWN RESOURCES: MOMENTUM FOR A REFORM ?70
MILAN CVIKL 
Milan Cvikl has been a Member of the European Court of Auditors since 2010. As the state secretary 
for the budget and public finances in Slovenia, he was responsible for the introduction of public finance 
reforms in preparation for Slovenia joining the European Union in 2004. 
Mr Cvikl is the author of a large number of publications, most of them dealing with public finance.
ALESSANDRO D’ALFONSO 
Alessandro D’Alfonso works in the European Parliamentary Research Service and is the author of 
many analytical publications, all of them dealing with various aspects of the EU budget. Several of his 
publications deal with the EU’s system of Own Resources including a recent in-depth analysis of the 
present debate on its reform. 
ALFREDO DE FEO 
Alfredo De Feo is Director of the Directorate for the Library at the European Parliament. Before that, he 
worked as head of the secretariat of the budget committee and was later appointed Director for Budgetary 
Affairs in the European Parliament. 
Recently, he has been seconded to the EUI as a European Parliament Fellow, attached to the Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced studies. He is currently working on a joint EP-EUI research project on 
Interinstitutional Relations in the budgetary sector from 1952 to the present.
JAMES ELLES 
James Elles was a Member of the European Parliament from 1984 to 2014 when he retired. He became 
an MEP after an eight-year career as a civil servant with the European Commission. 
Mr Elles held his seat for 30 years and when he stood down he was the longest-serving member of the 
European Parliament’s budget committee. He was appointed as “rapporteur” for two budgets – 1996 and 
2007. 
In 1992, Mr Elles founded the Trans-Atlantic Policy Network to encourage stronger ties between the EU 
and the USA.
SERGIO FABBRINI 
Sergio Fabbrini is Director of the School of Government and Professor of Political Science and International 
Relations at LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome, where he holds the Jean Monnet Chair in European 
Institutions and Politics. He co-founded and then directed the School of International Studies at the 
University of Trento from 2006 to 2009. Since 1996, he is Recurrent Professor of Comparative Politics at 
the Department of Political Science and the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California 
in Berkeley.
Mr Fabbrini is the author of numerous academic publications. In his most recent book from 2015 he 
examines the consequences of the Euro crisis for the European Union. 
EU OWN RESOURCES: MOMENTUM FOR A REFORM ?71
PASQUALE FERRARA 
Pasquale Ferrara is the Secretary General of the European University Institute. He joined the Italian 
Foreign Office in 1984 and has spent much of his career abroad, including postings in Chile and the 
United States. Positions in Europe include Brussels where he was involved, amongst other things, in the 
launching of the European Convention. 
In addition to his diplomatic duties, he continues to carry out research into the theory of international 
relations, and has published numerous articles in specialised journals and is the author of several volumes 
on international relations and political theory.
MONICA FRASSONI 
Monica Frassoni was a Member of the European Parliament from 1999 until 2009, when she was also 
co-chair of the European Greens-European Free Alliance group in the European Parliament.
Previously she was actively involved in the European Federalist Movement and in 1987 she was elected 
General Secretary of the European Organisation of Young Federalists.
In 2010 Mrs Frassoni took up the role of president of the European Alliance to Save Energy, a business 
organisation dedicated to promoting energy efficiency across Europe. 
BRIGID LAFFAN 
Brigid Laffan is Director and Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, and Director 
of the Global Governance Programme at the European University Institute (EUI), Florence. Before that 
she was professor of European politics at University College Dublin of which she was also the vice-
president. Her areas of research are European Integration, European Governance and Public Finances. 
She is the author of many publications on these topics. One of her books deals with the finances of the 
Union.
ALAIN LAMASSOURE 
Alain Lamassoure is one of the three representatives of the European Parliament in the High Level Group 
on Own Resources. He has been a Member of the European Parliament since 1989 and has served as 
chair of both the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Budgetary Control. Presently he chairs 
the Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect and he remains a 
substitute member of the Committee on Budgets.
JACQUES LE CACHEUX 
Jacques Le Cacheux is Professor of Economics at the Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour. He also 
teaches economics at Sciences Po (Paris) and runs the Stanford University Program in Paris. He has 
been an economist at the Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE) for over three 
decades. He is author and editor of many papers and volumes including a series of reports on the state 
of the European Union.
EU OWN RESOURCES: MOMENTUM FOR A REFORM ?72
THILO MAURER 
Thilo Maurer is working in the European Commission’s DG Budget, where his key responsibilities relate 
to his expertise in the analysis and application of the own resources system. He deals with the preparation 
of the own resources report and examines proposals to modify the own resources system. 
ANNE MONTAGNON 
Anne Montagnon is an official of the European Commission, where she began her career in DG Budget, 
the unit responsible for own resources. Presently, she is head of the task force on own resources which 
was set up within DG Budget.
MARIO MONTI 
Senator Mario Monti chairs the High-Level Group to reform the System of EU Own Resources, which 
was established in February 2014. Mr Monti is former EU commissioner and Prime Minister of Italy. He 
is also president of Bocconi University.
JORGE NÚÑEZ FERRER
Jorge Núñez Ferrer is an independent analyst and consultant associated with the Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS). Among his key areas of interest are the EU budget and EU funding. He is the 
author of numerous publications on EU policies. One of his most recent publications analyses the effects 
of the main investment tools of the EU budget on the European economy.
MARGIT SCHRATZENSTALLER 
Margit Schratzenstaller is a researcher specialised in public finance at the Austrian Institute of Economic 
Research (WIFO), and a consulting expert at the Austrian Fiscal Advisory Council at the Austrian National 
Bank. She is also a lecturer at the University of Vienna. The research areas in which she is interested 
concern the European budget and tax policy, international tax competition and harmonisation, fiscal 
federalism and gender budgeting. She is the author or co-author of numerous academic publications, 
including several dealing with the own resources system of the EU budget.
DANIEL TARSCHYS 
Daniel Tarschys has a distinguished career and background in academia and politics. He has served 
as a member of the Swedish parliament and as secretary of state. He was also secretary general of the 
Council of Europe and vice-president of the International Political Science Association. He is a member 
of the Swedish Royal Academy of Science. Daniel Tarschys has published widely, including important 
publications on the EU budget and the EU funds.
ANNE VITREY 
Anne Vitrey is Director of the Directorate for Budgetary Affairs at the European Parliament. She oversees 
the work of the secretariats for the Committees on Budgets and Budgetary Control as well as the Policy 
department on budgetary matters. Mme Vitrey is also a visiting professor at the College of Europe, in the 
European Political and Administrative Studies Department in Bruges.
She is the author and co-author of several publications dealing with the EU budget.
EU OWN RESOURCES: MOMENTUM FOR A REFORM ?73
PARTICIPANTS
Michael W. Bauer, German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer, Germany
Giacomo Benedetto, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK
Annemieke Beugelink, European Parliament
Gabriele Cipriani, European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg
Gregory Claeys, Bruegel, Belgium
Carlos Closa, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Italy
Milan Cviki, European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg
Alessandro D’Alfonso, European Parliament
Virgilio Dastoli, Rome
Alfredo De Feo, European University Institute, Italy / European Parliament, Belgium
James Elles, Former Member of the European Parliament, Belgium
Sergio Fabbrini, LUISS Guido Carli, Italy
Monica Frassoni, Former Member of the European Parliament, Belgium
Kate Henderson, European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg
Brigid Laffan, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Italy
Alain Lamassoure, European Parliament, Belgium
Jacques Le Cacheux, Sciences Po, France
Anne Montagnon, European Commission
Mario Monti, Italian Senate of the Republic, Italy
Jorge Nunez, Centre for European Policy Studies, Belgium
Paolo Ponzano, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Italy
Margit Schratzenstaller-Altzinger, Austrian Institute of Economic Research, Austria
Daniel Tarschys, Score, Stockholm University, Sweden 
Anne Vitrey, European Parliament and College of Europe
EU OWN RESOURCES: MOMENTUM FOR A REFORM ?170
ISBN: 978-92-9084-384-9
doi:10.2870/176147
Q
M
-01-16-048-EN
-N
